From owner-irn-mekong@netvista.net Mon May 1 14:25:54 2000 Return-Path: Received: from DaVinci.NetVista.net (mjdomo@mail.netvista.net [206.170.46.10]) by lox.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca (8.8.7/8.8.8) with ESMTP id OAA29869 for ; Mon, 1 May 2000 14:25:39 -0400 (EDT) From: owner-irn-mekong@netvista.net Received: [(from mjdomo@localhost) by DaVinci.NetVista.net (8.10.0/8.8.8) id e41IAq207498 for irn-mekong-list; Mon, 1 May 2000 11:10:52 -0700 (PDT) (envelope-from owner-irn-mekong@netvista.net)] Date: Mon, 1 May 2000 11:10:52 -0700 (PDT) Message-Id: <200005011810.e41IAq207498@DaVinci.NetVista.net> subject: LS: Salween Watch Hotmailout 6 Sender: owner-irn-mekong@netvista.net Precedence: bulk Status: RO XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX SALWEEN WATCH HOTMAILOUT May 1, 2000 Volume 6 XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX [Introduction] (1) SHAN: Japan to Channel Funds Through China (2) KHRG: Interview with "Sai Harn" (3) LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE: Thailand Taps Burma's Rivers (4) THE NATION: Chuan Shows Tact on Diplomacy (5) SHRF: Reports of Massacres (6) SHAN: Shan State Army - "Negotiations Have Not Begun" (7) MTBR: Intense Focus on Developing Sustainable Primary Industry (8) AP: UN Labor Agency Sends Burma Into Deeper Isolation (9) PROBE INTERNATIONAL: Peddling Yesterday's Technology XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX Dear Friends, Below, you will find updated information about the planned Ta Sang Dam on the Salween River in Shan State, Burma. Given the pariah status that the Burmese generals continue to hold, the builders may find it difficult to secure the financing for the construction of the dam. Any groups supporting the ill-conceived project will themselves gain pariah status. News from the Shan Herald Agency for News indicates that money may be funneled through a Chinese bank, a way for Japanese financiers to be once-removed and create a buffer against criticism. The studies at the dam site continue. The KHRG interview gives an eyewitness account of the activities at the dam site. In addition, on March 31, villagers sighted two Japanese men at the Thai-Burma border heading in to the dam-site. The article from Le Monde Diplomatique speculates on the connection between the Ta Sang dam plans and the Japanese Miyazawa Plan, a regional assistance fund from which the SPDC is theoretically excluded, making the possibilities of the assistance passing through a third-party more likely. Thailand's role in Asean's chaotic relationship with Burma continues to be a key factor affecting the Ta Sang Dam plans. In the article from The Nation included in this mailing, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai adds tourism to the Thai agenda for utilizing the resources of the Salween River. In Shan State, the grim daily situation continues for the majority of people, and for those who have been forcible displaced in particular. The Shan Human Rights Foundation contributes two articles to this mailing, reporting on two recent massacres in Shan State. All of those who were killed in the massacres had been forcibly relocated in the massive displacement policy that the military regime has carried out for the last four years. Both massacres occurred in areas that will be flooded if the Ta Sang Dam is built. Other news from inside Burma comes from the Myanmar Times and Business Review, a new English-language weekly newspaper out of Rangoon. The article included in this mailing gives insight into the SPDC's environmental policies, including use of water resources. The regime's labor policies have come under increasingly harsh criticism. The construction of the Ta Sang Dam will most likely involve the use of forced labor. The significant moves by the International Labor Organization to encourage member states to pressure the regime on this issue point to renewed multilateral efforts by the international community to hold the general accountable for the human rights abuses imposed on the Burmese people. This mailing ends with an excerpt from Probe International's speech delivered to the World Commission on Dams in February, 2000. The speech offers crisp insight into the problems of large dams and the growing trend to make the construction of them obsolete. Please feel free to contact us here at Salween Watch for any further information about the Ta Sang Dam or other issues related to the Salween River. Thank you for your ongoing support of our campaign to stop the dam and to save the river. Salween Watch salweenwatch@hotmail.com May 1, 2000 XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX 1/ Shan Herald Agency for News "THE SALWEEN DAM" SOURCE: JAPAN TO CHANNEL FUNDS THROUGH CHINA April 21, 2000 No: 4 - 6 An informed source from Rangoon told S.H.A.N. recently that an agreement had been made to channel Japanese financial assistance for the forthcoming construction of the Salween dam to Burma through a Chinese bank. The source, who requested withholding of her identity, said as it was difficult for Japan to hand out funds straight to Rangoon, due to the situation in Burma as well as the strong opposition of the west with regards to aiding the junta, it was agreed that the money would be deposited at the Bank of Shanghai that has a branch in Rangoon. The Chinese condition was that the bulk of the equipment needed for the construction be purchased from China, she said. Kendo, a Japanese construction company in Rangoon, was one of those that had been lobbying the Japanese financial sector for support for the dam project. The projected dam site, near Tasarng, between Mongpan and Mongton of Shan State, is currently under final study by GMS Power, a Thai company. The project is being opposed by Shans, Karens, Karennis and Mons who live along the Salween basin. *** S.H.A.N. is a non-profit, independent Shan media group. It is not affiliated to any political or armed organization. XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX 2/ Karen Human Rights Group INTERVIEW WITH "SAI HARN" April 5, 2000 [The following transcript is an excerpt of an interview, conducted in March, 2000, that appears in the recent KHRG report, "Exiled at Home: Continued Force Relocations and Displacement in Shan State." Readers can access the full texts of the report and the interview on-line at: . NAME: "Sai Harn" SEX: M AGE: 40 Shan Buddhist farmer/fisher FAMILY: Married, 6 children ADDRESS: Wo Long village, Kun Hing township INTERVIEWED: 3/00 ["Sai Harn" arrived in Thailand 3 days before he was interviewed. He was internally displaced for nearly 3 years, living on an island with his family in the middle of the Nam Pang River. On his way to Thailand, he floated down the Salween River on a raft and observed the final survey work on the Salween dam project.] Q: When was the last time you were in your original village? A: We were living in Nga Tang and then we left for Thailand. We lived in the fields because we are poor and we didn't have anything. We have many children, a big family, so we didn't move. We didn't try to move anywhere [to the relocation site]; we decided to live there even though we didn't have enough food and we always worried for the future and whether the Burmese soldiers would come and kill us. But we didn't die, and we came to Thailand. Q: Where did you go instead of being relocated? A: We lived on an island in the Nam Pang [River]. In Kun Hing township. Q: How long did you live on the island? A: More than 2 years. It will be 3 years in the coming 6th month [of the Shan lunar calendar, or May 2000 on the Gregorian calendar]. ... Q: Do you have a family to support? A: Yes, 6 children. Two of my older daughters are already married and I have two sons-in-law. We have two grandchildren. One of my nephews and his wife and child came along. Q: Did you have to leave secretly with your family? A: I told my relatives that I would go to Thailand. We just came because there was no one to be afraid of then. There were no soldiers around then. Q: Did you walk? A: We walked to the Salween River. We followed the Nam Pang until it got to the Salween, then we crossed near Murng Pu Long village in Murng Paeng township. We could not walk along the trail because we had to hide. Then we took a raft down the Salween River. Then we crossed to the eastern side of the Salween into Murng Paeng. We rafted down the Salween again for one day and one night. We crossed at Ta Sala. Then we went to Murng Ton by truck. Q: How long did it take you? A: 2 days and 1 night from Keng Kham to Ta Sala. Q: Did you see any machines by the Salween River? A: Yes, I saw drilling machines on both sides of the bank and some were sucking water and drilling. 3 machines on each bank. All together 6, but 3 on each side on 2 hills [aligned on 2 hills across the river from each other]. One was on the top, one in the middle, and one below on both banks. It was at Tang Ba Lai. It's upriver on the Salween. I saw Shan and Thai workers on both sides. There were Burmese too. I saw military camps on both sides. I didn't see everyone in the camp, but I think there were about 25 [soldiers] in each camp. I saw many workers, maybe 40 or 50. Shan workers get 500 Kyat per day. The Shan people were from around that area near the Salween. I know because we passed near them, and we had to stop at the Burmese military camp. We stopped and talked to the Shan workers for one hour [while they waited for the guards to decide if they could pass or not] and they told us all about it. We had to show them our ID cards when we were on the raft, but we said we didn't have ID cards because we were hiding in the jungle. The Burmese soldiers didn't say anything and they allowed us to pass there. We'd brought along some chickens and the soldiers even bought some of our chickens. Q: Did the soldiers fine you for passing through? A: No. The Burmese said, "Where do you come from?" We told the truth, "We come from Keng Kham." Q: Did you see Thai people there also? A: Yes, I saw them operating machines. The Shan also said that there were Thais among the workers. They were Thai workers [civilians], not Thai soldiers. Q: Did the workers have camps by the river? A: They had set up tents on the river bank. The tents had plastic tarps. Q: Did anyone know when the dam would start being built, or what the plan was for building? A: I asked the Shan workers, "Brother, do you know what you are building?" They said they didn't know what is going to be built there. They didn't tell the workers that they were building a dam. The people who live near the Salween River told me that they are building a dam. They told me when I got to Ta Sala. XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX 3/ Le Monde Diplomatique A PARADOXICAL ALLIANCE: THAILAND TAPS BURMA'S RIVERS February 2000 by Andri and Louis Boucaud The peaceful issue of the hostage crisis at the Burmese embassy in Bangkok on 2 October outraged the junta in Rangoon, but three months later the land border with Thailand reopened. Its closure, which paralysed part of the Burmese economy, was a further example of the stormy relations between the two neighbours, caught up in increasingly close ties but conflicting economic interests. On 14 December 1988, less than three months after the September crackdown, General Chaovalit Yongchaiyut, the commander in chief of the Thai army, travelled to Rangoon to explain what would later become the official line of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) countries - namely "constructive engagement", which included admission of Burma to Asean in July 1997. At the time Chaovalit negotiated lucrative trade contracts with the Burmese military concerning forestry concessions and fishing rights. In exchange he offered the State Peace Development Council (SPDC) junta his support for neutralising part of the Burmese opposition that had taken refuge on the Thai border. Numerous visits to Burma by Thai generals and ministers followed. However the wave of protest at home was such that it was only in March 1996 that a Thai prime minister, Banharn Silpa-Archa, dared make the trip to Rangoon. He was followed in March 1997 by Chaovalit who had in the meantime taken over as prime minister. On each occasion the Thai delegations came begging. For historical reasons Thailand has always been bothered by the aggressive behaviour of Burma, whose army has steadily increased in strength over the last 10 years thanks to substantial assistance from China. For 40 years Thailand maintained a buffer zone along its borders by supporting ethnic minorities opposed to Burma's central authority. But the change in direction outlined by Chaovalit in 1988, the aim of which was exclusively commercial, contributed to eliminating these rebellions and brought the armies of both countries face to face, a situation that had not existed since Burma won its independence. To put an end to this threat Thailand has repeatedly promoted closer political ties, sealed by solid economic relations. It is eager to get its hands on its neighbour's natural resources and longs to improve the terrible road network to make it easier for Thai products to penetrate the Burmese market. The agenda of the meeting between Chuan Leekpai and Than Shwe, which was held in Chiang Rai, a town in the north of Thailand rather than the capital Bangkok, included security issues, drug trafficking and crops to replace opium. Only the need for recognition, which the international community refuses, prompted the leaders of the Burmese junta to forget their traditional arrogance and accept such an inconspicuous visit. The summit meeting followed the February 1999 Interpol conference on heroine in Rangoon, the aim of which was to encourage Burma, currently one of the two largest opium producers in the world, to join the fight against drugs. The absence of the United States and certain European countries showed the Burmese military that they are still not seen as acceptable partners. At the subsequent summit, Than Shwe had to listen while the Thai prime minister expressed his concern about the massive influx into Thailand of Burmese drugs (mainly amphetamines), more or less openly insinuating that the government was involved. However, the Thai invitation did go some way to effacing the partial setback of the Interpol conference. Thailand, in conjunction with Asean, is an essential partner who may enable SPDC leaders to restore contacts with the European Union and the US. Than Shwe was accompanied by an impressive delegation including General Khin Nyunt, the head of the intelligence service and one of the regime's leading figures, and Win Aung, the new foreign minister. It was decided to strengthen cooperation between the two countries in the fight against drug production and trafficking and a permanent military committee was formed for this purpose. However the real motives of the two countries are subject to caution. The announcement of renewed cooperation was intended as a follow-up to the Interpol conference, for the SPDC is particularly keen to improve its image and by the same token relations with international agencies and the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). However the main priority is an end to US sanctions and resumption of economic aid (associated with the fight against drugs). Battle for water Although drugs were the main topic addressed during the Chiang Rai meeting it is quite possible that they were only a pretext. The situation in Thailand is certainly very serious - a report published by the Office of Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) in March 1999 states that 94% of the country's districts are affected, with 20% very seriously hit by a colossal influx of Burmese amphetamines. But there are more important stakes, namely water. For many years now, quite separately from the fact the northeast of the country has always had inadequate water resources, Thailand has suffered from a water shortage. This has been exacerbated by catastrophic deforestation, which despite having been banned 10 years ago has continued, barely disturbed by a few spectacular scandals involving political leaders. With the massive destruction of the forest the rainfall has diminished, the water is not absorbed by the soil and the monsoon no longer fills the reservoirs of the enormous dams built 30 years ago. In recent years the El Nino climatic phenomenon has further aggravated the situation. King Bhumiphol in person has mentioned the problem and the Crown, which initiated the Royal Irrigation Department, has made irrigation one of its priority objectives. The politicians had no choice but to react. With 28 large dams, 800 small dams and 1,000 low-capacity reservoirs, Thailand can scarcely hope to extract a drop more from its own water resources. In addition the authorities must now deal with a large number of environmental pressure groups and numerous protests by peasants opposed to dam projects. The government has therefore concluded that it can solve the problem by channeling water from Burma, which would also reduce opposition from the environmentalists. The natural border with Burma is formed by several rivers. The Salween river, that crosses the Shan State to reach the Gulf of Martaban, runs along the edge of Thailand for several dozen kilometres. It passes through sparsely populated mountains and jungle, until recently the scene of armed insurrection, and its catchment basin is almost completely undeveloped. Thailand plans to deprive the Salween and other rivers running along the border of some of the plentiful monsoon rainfall diverting it towards the reservoirs of its own dams. Looking further ahead, the government has already studied the feasibility of new dams and reservoirs, on the Salween and other rivers in Burma, from which the water could be directed to Thailand's rivers and reservoirs. As well as satisfying its needs for irrigation and drinking water for its population, Thailand also plans to use the natural resource as a source of electrical power. Although the current economic crisis and the drop in the demand for energy have delayed development projects, they have long been the subject of common interest for Bangkok and Rangoon. The question was first raised in April 1988 and discussions have continued ever since, despite the ups and downs of bilateral relations. In 1992 eight major hydroelectric dam projects were selected, some of which are entirely in Burma and others are on shared sections of the border rivers. Two consecutive years of catastrophic drought have given new impetus to the studies. At the instigation of the ministry of science the Thai government has recently allocated 186 million Baht (a little over $5m) to studies of the feasibility of diverting water from the Salween and Moei rivers to the Bhumiphol dam reservoir (1). Toward Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (Terra), a Thai non-governmental organisation (NGO), has attacked the project which will take water resources away from one group of people for the benefit of others, as well as upsetting the natural hydraulic balance with unforeseen consequences. Other more discreet projects have also been the subject of detailed study for 10 years. They concern the construction of a colossal dam on the Salween, in the southern part of the Shan State. The plans were revealed by local Shan NGOs, but there has been no official reaction. The secrecy is due to the fact that the Thai and Burmese authorities are working together in an insurgent area where the Burmese army has relentlessly persecuted the Shan civilian population (2). Between October 1998 and the end of March 1999 several teams of experts - Thais belonging to MDX Power Co. and Burmese from a firm called Aye Chan Aye, assisted by about 20 Japanese specialists from Electronic Power Development Corporation (EPDC) - inspected three sites in the Salween gorges about 120 km from the Thai border, on either side of the Ta Sang bridge near the village of Wan Hsala. Geological studies, test bores and feasibility studies were carried out. Depending on the site, the size and design of the structure, and the output of the hydraulic turbines, the cost of the dam will range from $3b to $3.4b. Total production is estimated at 3,400 megawatts, a quarter of which would go to Burma with Thailand purchasing the rest. As for plans to draw off water, as much as 10% of the Salween could be diverted via channels and existing rivers, over a distance of 300 km, to join the Kok and Ping rivers in Thailand. No estimate has been made of the cost of transporting the water but it is thought to be particularly high. This part of the Shan State is the operational base of the armed Shan nationalist resistance movement, which is opposed to the junta in Rangoon. Subin Pinkayon, a member of parliament, former minister and advisor to the Thai company MDX Power, contacted the Shan opposition to convince Colonel Yord Serk, the head of the Shan State Army South (SSAS), not to obstruct the work of the experts. The largest problem, however, remains how to fund the scheme, a task that has been made even more difficult by the financial crisis in Asia. Locally a great deal of speculation centres on the so-called Miyazawa Plan, initiated in October 1998 by Japanese finance minister Kiichi Miyazawa to inject $30b into Asian countries affected by the crisis. Burma is theoretically excluded from the plan on account of its deplorable human rights record. But the country is desperately in need of electricity. It is also suffering from drought. The Lawpita dam, near Loikaw in the Karenni state, is only half full. Dozens of towns are not even electrified and there are frequent power cuts in Mandalay and Rangoon at all hours of the day and night, upsetting their already unsteady economic activity. A great many businesses in Rangoon are fitted with little diesel generators, adding to the overall noise and atmospheric pollution. All this explains why the military junta in Burma is ready to cooperate fully with Thailand. A dam on the Salween, which could be justified as an exclusively Thai investment, would thus qualify for Miyazawa Plan funds. The projected dam on the Salween does not only worry environmental pressure groups and the local population. It is seen as a serious threat by the NGOs and the Shan opposition due to the side effects of such development projects. The Yadana gas pipeline, built by the French firm Total and the US company Unocal, served as an excuse for ethnic cleansing of the Tenasserin region of Burma, supposedly justified by the fight against Mon and Karen separatist guerrillas. Although the management of these companies deny any responsibility and refute any violence, the tens of thousands of Mon and Karen refugees in camps along the Thai border are there to bear witness to what has happened (3). In their eagerness to prepare the future the Burmese generals started ethnic cleansing well before work commenced. In the Shan State forced movements of population started in 1996. The Burmese army justifies these measures by the presence of armed groups belonging to the SSAS, who must be deprived of all popular support. Over 300,000 Shan people have been driven out of their villages, losing everything. The fear of being used as forced labour for building the dam has triggered a huge new wave of Shan refugees on the northern border. No record is kept of the pillage, rape and killing here. Few voices speak out in protest and there are neither television for eye-witnesses. Under the sacrosanct pretext of development and the fight against the economic crisis the Thai government may well give SPDC leaders the go-ahead to continue undisturbed their repression of local populations, most of whom belong to ethnic minorities. United Nations resolutions condemning Burma have scarcely any impact on the junta. The idea promoted by Asean's constructive engagement policy that economic development should bring more democracy has so far not received the slightest positive response. And yet this was why Jacques Chirac supported Burma's application to join Asean in a statement to the Far Eastern Economic Review in May 1997. Here again support for economic interests took precedence over full consideration for the human rights situation. It seems that some dictatorships are more acceptable than others - providing of course that their presence facilitates international investment. (1) The cost of the various solutions ranges from 8b Baht ($216m), with a dam on the Moei river and one billion cubic metres of water diverted each year, to 23b Baht ($621m) for a pumping station on the Salween, upstream storage dams and channels to divert the water as far as Bhumiphol reservoir. (2) See "Repression and drug trafficking", Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, November 1998. (3) With all the other NGOs that it coordinates the Burma Border Consortium already manages aid to 115,000 Karen and Mon refugees who have reached the camps on the western border of Thailand. Translated by Harry Forster XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX 4/ The Nation CHUAN SHOWS TACT ON DIPLOMACY February 28, 2000 by Kavi Chongkittavorn Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai seldom discusses Thai diplomacy or our policies towards neighbouring countries. But when he does sit down and talk about Thai foreign policy, he reveals a deep understanding and sensitivity about the need to strengthen relations and promote the country's image overseas. During his administration he has allowed both Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan and Deputy Foreign Minister MR Sukhumbhand Paribatra to take total control of the direction of Thai diplomacy because he trusts them. Now, with less than 10 months to the next election, the prime minister wants to improve ties further with Thailand's closest neighbours, which are Asean's four newest members. He also wants to ensure that Thailand's contributions to the peace building in East Timor remain unabated. "We need bold decisions and support from our friends," he said. Last week the prime minister broke away from his mundane routine and sat down over an informal dinner with a group of editors and chatted about the whole gamut of Thai foreign policy and politics. It was his view of Thai diplomacy that impressed his hosts. Chuan, who has not visited Burma, expressed the wish that the situation inside the country were more conducive for him to go there. Burma remains the only Asean country he has not yet officially visited. Even though there have been confrontations and unpleasant skirmishes along the Thai-Burmese border and in the Andaman Sea, Chuan said, Thailand has been firm in its positions. "No hanky-panky," he said referring to Thai-Burmese relations. He predicts in the long run these bilateral ties will improve greatly because both sides are dealing with each other with respect, not basing it on personalities as in the past. Previously, Thai military leaders were the main contacts with the Burmese junta leaders. "We are democratic, and we have a process, not a personality," he said. It was easy in the past to resolve some of the conflicts emanating from cross-border activities between Thailand and Burma, "but the resolutions did not last," he pointed out. The Foreign Ministry, he said, handles Thai-Burmese relations, though he is aware that Rangoon is constantly testing Thailand's unity over its policy towards Burma, even now it is in civilian hands. And he reiterated that Burma had to come to grips with the new reality. In fact, the junta leaders in Burma lament the fact that Thai military leaders have not contacted them now for a year. One of his dreams is to see the development of the Salween River as a tourist attraction that will benefit the peoples living in the area. "I have flown over the river, and it is a most magnificent river, snaking through beautiful mountains." That will come when Thailand and Burma overcome their current bilateral problems, including demarcation of the 2,400-km border, he said, which he was confident they would, citing Thai-Vietnamese relations to back his optimism... XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX 5/ Shan Human Rights Foundation (SHRF) REPORTS OF MASSACRES SHRF MONTHLY REPORT -- FEBRUARY 2000 MASSACRE OF INNOCENT VILLAGERS IN KUN-HING On 30.1.00, 19 relocated villagers who were allowed by the local SPDC military authorities to return to their former village of Kaeng Kham were massacred by SPDC troops from Nam-Zarng-based IB66 led by Capt. Zaw Thein, at Kaeng Kham village, Kun-Hing township. On 18.1.00, the commander of SPDC Kun-Hing-based IB246, Col. Kyaw Aye called a meeting of village and tract leaders and people who were forcibly relocated to the town in 1996-98. At the meeting, Commander Kyaw Aye told the villagers that he received an order from Rangoon that people originally from the villages on the main road from Kun-Hing to Kaeng Tawng, in Murng-Nai township, would be allowed to go back to their villages. Anyone who wanted to return to their former villages to clear their places and fix their ruined houses needed to get a pass from the military authorities and pay 50 Kyat each to the pass issuers, the commander said. After he finished talking, the commander immediately dismissed the meeting before anyone could say or ask anything. On 18.1.00, Loong Kyawng Su (m), aged 57, originally from Kaeng Kham village, discussed the matter with his relatives and decided to have a try. Altogether 19 of them went to ask for a pass from the military and this was issued. On the morning of 19.1.00, they all prepared a ration of food and some other necessities and went to the deserted village of Kaeng Kham and started to clear their old places for the rest of the day. On 30.1.00, the villagers continued to clear a part of the village which had virtually turned into a jungle. At about 12:30 hrs, a column of about 85-90 SPDC troops, with 40 forced civilian porters, from IB66 led by Capt. Zaw Thein came through the jungle and, when they saw the villagers clearing the deserted village, surrounded and shot at them until all of them died. The SPDC troops claimed that they had shot at a group of rebels who had come to set up a stronghold at Kaeng Kham deserted village. The following is the list of the victims: 1. Loong Kyawng Su (m), aged 57 2. Loong Ka-Ling (m), aged 51 3. Loong Aw-Zae-Ya (m), aged 49 4. Loong Pan La (m), aged 47 5. Sai Ma-La (m), aged 45 6. Sai Kyaw La (m), aged 44 7. Sai Woon (m), aged 41 8. Sai Zaam Khur (m), aged 36 9. Sai Thun Awang (m), aged 33 10. Sai Mint (m), aged 30 11. Sai Min (m), aged 27 12. Sai Awng Sa (m), aged 24 13. Sai Nu (m), aged 20 14. Sai Man (m), aged 17 15. Sai Laao (m), aged 16 16. Sai Mu (m), aged 15 17. Naang Ing (f), aged 34 18. Naang Nyunt (f), aged 26 19. Naang Thun (f), aged 22 (Note: Another witness stated that the troops surrounded, arrested and interrogated the villagers even after they showed the pass to them, and eventually shot all of them dead) SHRF MONTHLY REPORT -- MARCH 2000 20 DISPLACED PERSONS IN HIDING MASSACRED IN KUN-HING On 12.2.00, 20 villagers who were conducting an annual respect-paying rite at an altar of a territorial guardian spirit at Loi-maak-hin-taang were massacred by a column of SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) troops from IB246, in Kun Pu tract, Kun-Hing township, and 5 other villagers were also killed at a different place by the same troops on the same day. These villagers were among those who had been forcibly displaced a few years ago by the SLORC/SPDC troops and had been in hiding since then, trying to survive by secretly growing small plots of rice and foraging for wild vegetables, games and fish. As it had been a long established practice for the villagers in the area to pay respect to the guardian spirit once a year, the villagers prepared some traditional offerings and 20 men went to Loi-maak-hin-taang where there was an altar, set up long ago by their ancestors. A patrol of about 80-90 SPDC troops from IB246 led by Capt. Hla Khin saw them and shot all of them dead. The troops then ate all the food they found among the offerings and continued to patrol the area, and shot dead another 5 women and children who were hiding in a makeshift hut in forest in the area. The following is the list of the names of the 20 male victims and their original villages. All were in Kun Pu tract in Kun-Hing township: 1. Zaai Yunt, aged 21, Kun Pu village 2. Zaai Awng, aged 30, Kun Pu village 3. Zaai Mu, aged 41, Kun Pu village 4. Zaai Kaw, aged 36, Kun Pu village 5. Zaai Maw-Nae-Ya, aged 25, Kun Pu village 6. Zaai Thun Nae, aged 22, Kun Pu village 7. Zaai Lon, aged 34, Kun Pu village 8. Lung Saw, aged 47, Paang Khaa village 9. Zaai Khur Seng, aged 43, Paang Khaa village 10. Zaai Mu-Ling, aged 34, Paang Khaa village 11. Zaai Pan-Ti, aged 33, Loi Yaang village 12. Zaai Ka-Ling, aged 24, Loi Yaang village 13. Zaai Taan, aged 26, Loi Yaang village 14. Zaai Wi, aged 37, Loi Yaang village 15. Zaai Maad, aged 40, Loi Yaang village 16. Zaai Taw-Ya, aged 23, Loi Yaang village 17. Lung Lam, aged 51, Naa Ke village 18. Lung Paan La, aged 53, Naa Ke village 19. Lung Laan, aged 44, Naa Ke village 20. Zaai Zi-Na, aged 31, Naa Ke village The following is the list of the 5 other villagers shot dead at different place: 1. Mae Thao Mya (f), aged 65 2. Naang Kya Yong (f), aged 37 (wife of Lung Saw of Paang Khaa village who was killed earlier in the group of 20) 3. Naang Awng (f), aged 18 4. Zaai La Khin (m), aged 15 5. Zaai Thun (m), aged 11 XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX 6/ Shan Herald Agency for News SHAN STATE ARMY - "NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT BEGUN" April 2, 2000 No: 4 - 2 A highly placed source from the Shan State Army South of Yawdserk has denied there were any negotiations with the junta, as reported earlier by several agencies. Orntern, regarded as Yawdserk's spokesman, told S.H.A.N. yesterday what had transpired so far was only some exchanges of messages between the Shan State Army South's 727th Brigade and the area commander in Mongton Township. "Negotiations have not begun at all, although we are prepared for them, if there are going to be any," he said. According to the Shan State Army's statement No. 2/2000 on 6 March, Rangoon, after receiving the SSA's Statement No. 1/2000 dated 25 January, stating its desire to resolve problems by peaceful means, had dispatched a delegation to the former with "4 truce terms": acknowledgement of the SSA's right to bear arms, the right "to trade in whatever they like", the right to be free of other armed groups in the areas where the SSA is active and to surrender their arms in future along with other ceasefire groups. In response, the SSA stated its own conditions on 3 March, as follows: 1. That the SPDC troops remain in the urban areas; 2. That the SSA retains the right to manage its own educational and financial programs; 3. That there be no use of force to resolve problems; 4. That there be no levying of either porters or provisions in the SSA's area; 5. That the SSA has the right to freely communicate with other groups for the peace and development of future Shan State; and 6. That the SSA shall solicit approval by the people of Shan State prior to agreement to surrender. It also set the deadline for Rangoon's response as end of April. However, another bulletin from SSA on 18 March that rendered a translation of Yawdserk's letter to Senior General Than Shwe, Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council, fixed the latest date for reply to 31 March instead. In the letter, the SSA demanded the negotiations take place in Thailand with "authorities from at least two countries" as witnesses. Referring to it, Orntern said, "So far we have received only a request to wait as the authorities in Rangoon are still in session to decide on the matter." Militarily, the junta's activities in the SSA's operational zones are, on the whole, still in abeyance, according to him. *** S.H.A.N. is a non-profit, independent Shan media group. It is not affiliated to any political or armed organization. XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX 7/ Myanmar Times and Business Review INTENSE FOCUS ON DEVELOPING SUSTAINABLE PRIMARY INDUSTRY March 14-19, 2000 Volume 1, No.2 Myanmar's first international weekly Journal Economy FOOD sufficiency for the people equals national economic progress." So said Myanmar's Prime Minister Than Shwe, speaking on Peasants Day in 1998. Indeed agriculture is the foundation of Myanmar's economy, accounting for some 35 per cent of total export earnings. Only when agricultural-based industry is improved and built up, can the country hope to progress itself into the vision it has set. The task, although awesome, is being attacked in a logical and forthright manner. With 38pc of its GDP coming from primary industry then it is not surprising that the Government has focused much of its attention on achieving the goal of self sufficiency and creating products suitable for export and the earning of hard currency. More importantly some 64pc of the work-force is directly employed in farming. With a growth rate of 1.87pc annually, it means that by the year 2010 there will be a population of 60 million people. The Prime Minister and Senior General, Than Shwe, has warned of impending catastrophe if timely measures are not undertaken to grow enough food to feed the people. Importation of food-grains is not the answer, as it will squander precious foreign exchange and pre-empt funds earmarked for economic and social development. The government has a comprehensive plan in place to implement development so that the population will be self-sustained and that crops will be sufficient to increase export earnings. This plan involves the application of five parallel and interlocking strategies. IRRIGATION There are 18 million hectares of arable land in Myanmar, of which only 9m hectares are being cultivated. A sizeable proportion of the remaining 9 million hectares is located in areas with insufficient rainfall to make cultivation feasible. On the other hand, the volume of water-resources in the country totals some 870 million acre feet, of which only 6pc is being utilised at present. The Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation is resorting to five methods to promote the exploitation of water sources. These are: the construction of new dams and reservoirs, the storage of water flowing from watershed areas, renovation of existing dams and reservoirs, damming of creeks and rivers when they are in spate, pumping of water from rivers and creeks, and recovery of underground water. Impressive results have already been attained through the use of these strategies. Since 1988, a total of 97 dams and reservoirs have been built at a cost of 1.4 billion kyats (US$4.3m) and commissioned into service. The projects that have been completed are already providing irrigation water to over 1.3 million acres of farmland. RECLAMATION The Government has initiated a nation-wide campaign to reclaim 9m hectares of wetlands and virgin, vacant and fallow lands. Already the project has achieved some success. In l996-97 more than 150,000 acres of additional land were brought under cultivation. Myanmar has adopted a free market economic system, and in keeping with this the financial resources of the private sector are being used in to reclaim wetlands and waste land in rural areas. 36,000 acres have been reclaimed this year by private operators and put under cultivation. In Tanintharyi Division alone contractors have placed 500,000 acres under oil palm, 50,000 acres under rubber and 5000 acres under rice paddy. The Prime Minister assured local farmers that their interests would not be jeopardised by the introduction of large-scale farming by entrepreneurs and pointed out that they would in fact profit from exposure to modern scientific methods of cultivation and would benefit from increased employment opportunities with the establishment of large scale farms in their regions. One of the approaches being adopted by the Government is the introduction of mechanised agriculture. This was first tried some years ago but received a set-back when heavy ploughing machines bogged down in the muddy paddy fields and had to be hauled out by teams of oxen. Not to be deterred light and versatile machines were tried and found to perform satisfactorily. Nationally produced machines for ploughing, harrowing, planting, reaping and threshing are now available. The use of machinery in agriculture of course should raise productivity, cut processing time and bring about economies of scale so that efficiency becomes a key philosophy in order to compete globally. In 1998, 4m acres were put under summer paddy as well as during the rainy season. This helped to increase paddy production to 100 million baskets yearly. DIVERSIFICATION The government has been attempting to promote the growing of alternative crops. Together with paddy it has designated sugarcane, cotton, pulses and beans as the Four Pillars of Agriculture in its Four Pillars/Four Crops strategy. Agro-related ventures are being accorded high priority. These include horticulture, sericulture, acquaculture, bee-keeping, livestock breeding and fresh-water and offshore fishing and prawn-breeding, all of which are being promoted in tandem with development of the agriculture sector and are helping to expand the export market. Already the fish and prawn sector is the third largest foreign exchange earner in the economy. In 1998-99, 3254 Myanmar fisheries produced 37.5 million viss of fish from 25,000 acres of fishponds. INFRASTRUCTURE It is not sufficient to merely boost agricultural production. Farmers need ways of sending their produce to markets in the rest of the country and abroad. To solve this challenge the government has embarked on a crash program to extend and upgrade existing transport infrastructure. Considerable success has already been achieved in this regard. The SPDC, during its 12 years of stewardship, has already laid close to a 1000 miles of new railway line as part of its strategy for infrastructure development. The building of roads and highways is also proceeding at pace. Despite extraordinary difficulties 2057 miles of new roads have been completed, while another 4098 miles are under construction. As a practical proposition, it is impossible to dissociate the construction of railroads and highways from the building of bridges, and the government has consequently launched an extensive program of bridge construction projects. These extensive bridge building projects are being implemented in all States and Divisions of the Union. (Professor U Sein Tu has a Master in Arts from Columbia University and Ph.D from Harvard University.) XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX 8/ Associated Press UN LABOR AGENCY SENDS BURMA INTO DEEPER ISOLATION March 29, 2000 GENEVA, March 28 AP - The United Nations labor agency today opened unprecedented proceedings to bring Myanmar to book for its failure to address repeated criticism of its use of forced labor. Invoking an option that has never been used before, the 174-nation International Labor Organisation's governing body called on its annual conference to take "any such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance" with its rules. "It really represents a deepening of Myanmar's isolation within this organisation," ILO spokesman John Doohan said. Last year, the ILO barred the government from receiving assistance from it. In August 1998, a commission appointed by the ILO roundly condemned Myanmar, also known as Burma, for widespread and systematic use of forced labor. "There has been no significant progress in eliminating forced labor and there has been no significant progress in complying with the special commission of inquiry," Doohan said. He noted that "there are no provisions in the ILO for expelling a member state." It was unclear what consequences today's decision would have. Possible options include recommendations to member countries, unions and organisations that they review relations with Myanmar to ensure they are not abetting forced labor, Doohan said. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which includes Myanmar, were reluctant to call for the unprecedented action against Myanmar but did not oppose the decision. Myanmar "rejected totally and categorically" the decision, Doohan said. "They repeated the accusations are unfounded." The government has said it is a responsible member of the ILO and accused western governments of making politically motivated allegations. Myanmar officials in Geneva were unavailable for comment, but earlier this month, Myanmar rejected a US government report on labor practices in the military-ruled Southeast Asian country, describing its charges of widespread use of forced labor as "false and malicious allegations." XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX 9/ Probe International PEDDLING YESTERDAY'S TECHNOLOGY: AID FOR LARGE HYDRO DAMS MUST BE STOPPED February 27, 2000 by Grainne Ryder, Policy Director, Probe International, Canada Excerpt of Speech to the World Commission on Dams Hanoi, Vietnam Thank you ladies and gentlemen for this opportunity to speak today to the World Commission on Dams. The mandate of the World Commission on Dams is to review the effectiveness of big dams and to set new international guidelines for dam building so past mistakes can be avoided. Given this mandate, I believe that the purpose of this commission is to tell the world the truth about big dams. That is why I have traveled from Canada to Vietnam to talk to you today. Let me start by saying what I think many of you already understand but dare not admit. The era of building big dams is over. There is no public policy reason for aid agencies to support large hydro development in this region. Big hydro dams are out-of-date and uncompetitive with the alternative methods of generating electricity. Anyone who says that large hydro dams can make economic sense with a little bit of fixing and new international guidelines is promoting a fiction. I think this commission is part of it. In the real world of electricity generation today, big dams are yesterday's technology. Those of us who are following utility reform around the world know it, and I think members of this commission, who sit in the boardrooms of the world's largest utilities and dam-building companies, know it too. Whether we're talking about China, Thailand, Canada, Europe, or the United States, the writing is on the wall. Big hydro dams, along with nuclear power stations, and big coal plants, are being replaced with decentralized, high-efficiency generating technologies. Where competition and private power production exists, these new technologies are the investment of choice. Ask any private investor or lender if they are willing to risk their capital on big hydro dams. Their answer is "No." Not only is the private sector refusing to build new big hydro dams, existing dams are starting to be dismantled because citizens know that the economic value of a free-flowing river can be far greater than the power produced from a dam. But if big hydro dams are uneconomic and obsolete, why are dams still under construction in some countries you ask? The only thing that keeps big dams under construction and on the drawing boards are state subsidies, state monopolies, and the socialization of private risk. Big hydro dams continue to be built whenever dam proponents have access to the deep pockets of taxpayers. Without taxpayers to subsidize the capital costs of big dams, without taxpayers to internalize private sector risk, without monopolies to keep competitors out, without public oversight, without market discipline, and without the power to expropriate riverine communities' resources with impunity, few, if any, big hydro dams would be under construction today. Few would ever have been built in the past. Consumers and taxpayers are starting to understand this and they are demanding changes. Dam builders, as a result, are losing their special powers and protection. The dam industry is struggling for its own survival. Let me explain my point with examples. I'll start with the biggest, most expensive, and most socially destructive dam in the world today. China's Three Gorges dam now under construction on the Yangtze river. At the official cost estimate of $30 billion (all my figures are in U.S. dollars), Three Gorges' power will cost approximately 8.4 cents per kilowatt-hour. At that price, the Three Gorges Project Development Corporation will have difficulty finding customers. Under more likely circumstances, Three Gorges' power will be even more expensive as technical problems and operating conflicts plague the dam, crippling its output. Then there's the additional $30 billion the government has to invest in upgrading the country's decrepit transmission system so it can handle the dam's output. Assuming consumers aren't charged for transmission costs (and discounting environmental and cultural wreckage), Three Gorges' power will cost more than nuclear power and at least two to three times more than power from gas-fired combined cycle plants. This will encourage China's large power consumers to leave the state-run grid for cheaper independent power producers, or install their own power plants, leaving Three Gorges' excessive costs for remaining consumers, mostly small farms and urban residents, who are already angry about the high cost of electricity. [ ... ] Let me put this in the plainest language possible. In all likelihood, the Three Gorges project corporation will be saddled with a $30-billion dam and no customers for its power. Its investment costs will become "stranded" that is, no longer recoverable as ratepayers opt for cheaper suppliers. Stranded costs are not just a Chinese problem. Utilities in North America face huge stranded costs, wherever they have made uneconomic investments in large central power stations (i.e., large hydro, coal, and nuclear). In the United States alone, analysts estimate that stranded costs in the electricity sector could be as much as $200 billion, and that many utilities will go bankrupt in the transition to decentralized, competitive markets. In Asia and elsewhere, the world in which big hydro dams thrived is unraveling - public monopolies are being dismantled, the private sector is rejecting big dams in favour of investments in less-risky power projects, governments are refusing to subsidize big dams, and citizens everywhere are demanding that dam builders internalize their costs or, in other words, take financial responsibility for their actions. Big dams are surviving only where institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, and the governments they finance, continue to socialize private risk, and trample on the rights of hundreds of thousands of people in riverine communities. [ ... ] Elsewhere in the Mekong region, the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank are promoting a lineup of big hydro dams using the same methods of cost and risk externalization. As the ADB concluded in its evaluation of ADB-financed hydro schemes last year: "If compliance with evolving policies is required, additional contingency funding may be needed so the Project's economic viability is not affected." Even with all environmental costs externalized, big dams proposed in this region have capital costs ranging from $1,200 to more than $2,500 per installed kilowatt, and that doesn't include transmission costs. A gas-fired combined cycle plant, on the other hand, costs anywhere from $600 to $900 per installed kilowatt, without flooding people off their land, and destroying their forests and fisheries. Clearly, allowing dam builders to profit while others are forced to pay for the costs and risks of their scheme is an economically inefficient and disastrous strategy for development. So how should society decide what kinds of electricity investment decisions are the best ones? Well, society shouldn't decide. That's the problem: planners, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, governments, and conservation organizations, have been making these hydro dam investment decisions and dressing them up as if they are in society's best interest. They never were. To use the words of a Chinese critic of that country's dam building record, "those who have suffered are not the beneficiaries while those who have benefitted are not the sufferers." The best insurance against careless decision-making is to empower those who have to live with a decisions' consequences - whether environmental, financial, or cultural - with the rights and tools to make a decision in their interest and in the interest of their communities. The time has come to get governments out of dam building, to stop the socialization of risk, and to force all energy investors to internalize the costs of their investment. This means that people's riparian rights (and customary rights to land, forests, and fisheries) must be respected. If they are, hopeful dam developers will be obliged to make fair deals for the resources they consume. They will be obliged to convince those whose land will be flooded, whose fisheries will be destroyed, whose communities will be displaced, to agree (or not) and compensate them accordingly. Citizens need effective laws that recognize their ownership and uphold their rights as resource owners (individual and collective). Only then can citizens force developers to win the approval of all potential victims rather than the onus being on potential victims to defend themselves against environmental aggressors. With strong property rights, rights holders would have the right to say "no" to a developer, to stop a project (i.e., by getting an injunction from the court) before or after a project has been approved. They would also have the right to sue developers for damages to their health, property, resources, and livelihoods. But citizens and electricity consumers need more than this to protect themselves. The monopolies that have caused so much economic and environmental damage must be removed. Aid agencies and governments must stop protecting developers from the real costs and risks of their schemes; after all, if private investors won't accept these costs and risks why should taxpayers and the rural poor have to? Governments must respect the rule of law so consumers and investors' rights are protected. Governments must end the practice of virtually unlimited utility borrowing against the public purse and concentrate on becoming effective regulators rather than investors. They must establish open and accountable regulatory frameworks to ensure that costs and risks are not arbitrarily inflicted on any parties and to ensure that those affected by investments are afforded due process. Most importantly, governments must limit their powers of expropriation, which have allowed dam builders to wreck people's lives, flood their land, and destroy resources with impunity. We see no role for aid agencies in developing countries' electricity sectors. This commission has the mounting evidence of their dreadful record before it and yet aid institutions remain myopic and obtuse in their support of big dams. They should stop promoting hydro dams and remove themselves from the electricity business. When no developer receives special favours from either governments or aid agencies, better investment decisions will be assured. The only way that future dams will get built is if they are kept on life support by aid institutions and compliant governments that can ignore economic reality and overrule the environmental rights of hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens on this continent and others. Citizens, ratepayers, and taxpayers will not tolerate such contempt for their rights and the financial recklessness that has bankrupted utilities, created poverty in rural areas, and destroyed the resources upon which citizens depend. Aid agencies and governments should end their support for this obsolete industry. Author's Background Gráinne Ryder, Policy Director, Probe International, CANADA I am a water resources engineer by training and hold a masters' degree in environmental studies. I've designed and supervised construction of small irrigation dams and studied traditional irrigation systems when I was a CUSO volunteer in Thailand in the early 1980s. I have spent the last 15 years working to reform the policies of aid agencies and the practices of Canadian dam builders, working with Canada's Probe International, and as a co-founder of TERRA, a Bangkok-based citizens' group investigating the impact of Thailand's development policies and foreign aid on neighbouring countries. I have edited a book on the problems with the Canadian feasibility study for China's Three Gorges dam. I have traveled along Mekong and Salween waterways, talked with the farming and fishing communities threatened by big hydro development, and I have edited a book in praise of rural Mekong communities and their undammed "liquid assets," entitled The Mekong Currency. Probe International has been investigating the activities of Canadian dam builders and aid institutions overseas for the past two decades, responding to requests from Third World citizens' groups to help them fight destructive aid-financed dams, mines, and forestry programs. Probe International is a division of Energy Probe Research Foundation, a leading environmental and utility reform advocacy group that has argued for breaking up electricity monopolies in Canada since the early 1980s and is helping to set the rules for Ontario's new electricity market. Gráinne Ryder can be reached at GrainneRyder@nextcity.com XXxx<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>xxXX