From: pyrrhos@einstein.et.tudelft.nl (P.T. Stathis) Message-Id: <199410101058.AA283356726@einstein.et.tudelft.nl> Subject: Acheloos divertion To: dianne@sandelman.ocunix.on.ca (Dianne Murray) Date: Mon, 10 Oct 1994 11:58:46 +0100 (MET) THE ACHELOOS DIVERSION PROJECT A BRIEF GUIDE For further information contact: WWF GREECE, Asklipiou 14, Athens 106 80 GREECE tel/fax (01) 3623342 attn. Yiorgos Politis or Vassilios Katsoupas and Hellenic Ornithological Society, Emmanouil Mpenaki 53, GREECE tel/fax (01) 3611271 attn. Kostas Vassilakis Description of the Acheloos basin Acheloos is the longest river in Greece and has its sources in the mountain range of Pindos, near the town of Metsovo. The Pindos range is the southernmost extension of the European Alps. It forms the backbone of continental Greece in the NW - SE direction. It thus constitutes the principal watershed between the eastern and western hydrological systems. Acheloos flows initially over mountainous country on the western side of the watershed. Cutting through narrow gorges, rich in vegetation and fauna the upper Acheloos then traverses the agricultural plain of Agrinion, finally adding its waters to the Ionian Sea by the northern tip of the Messolongi wetlands. The entire catchment area of the river is estimated at 4,500 km2. Together with river Evinos further to the East, Acheloos contributes to the formation of the Messolongi - Aetoliko lagoon system, important for its fish breeding capacity and one of the most extensive wetland complexes in the Mediterranean. Existing ecological conditions in the lower Acheloos basin: ----------------------------------------------------------- The Messolongi wetland complex is one of the 11 sites in Greece afforded special protection status under the Ramsar Convention (see table next page). The ecological conditions of the Messolongi wetlands have degraded steadily in the last decades due to a dearth of environmental protection measures and to non-enforcement of the existing legislation. The construction of several dams in the lower Acheloos basin has reduced the supply of sediment rendering unstable the sandbanks which protect the shallow lagoons. Fish migration has also been disrupted since no adequate provisions were made for this purpose during the construction of the dams. Irrigation and drainage works have cut direct surface flow of freshwater into the wetlands. Groundwater flow from Acheloos is thought to be playing an important role in the preservation of the wetlands. The diversion of Evinos river to provide potable water for Athens (250 km. away) further imperils the future of the wetlands. This diversion is currently under construction. A third river in the area, Mornos, was also diverted in the recent past, for the same purpose. Intensive farming in the plain surrounding the lagoons, untreated sewage discharge from the town of Aetoliko and reduction of water inflow from the Acheloos lead to periodic blooms of eutrophication in all the lagoons. Consequently, massive fish kills have been observed in the Aetoliko lagoon. Aquaculture units together with the corresponding infrastructure have destroyed large areas of natural habitat within the protected area. Fish farms at the mouth of Acheloos within zone A of the Ramsar site (absolute protection) and at the Klisova lagoon within zone B have been permitted by the Greek state and financed by the European Community. Illegal housing and a proliferation of Fishermen huts also within the protected area have altered the aesthetic value of the landscape and added to the general pressure on the environment. Despite all the pressure, the Messolongi wetlands complex retains its value as a Ramsar site. The Hellenic Ornithological Society has conducted studies which indicate the site is still an important habitat for a large number and variety of species including those in the "rare and endangered" and "threatened" categories. The Acheloos diversion project: ------------------------------- Presented as a multi-purpose scheme, the diversion of Acheloos was originally aimed at: Providing irrigation water for 380,000 hectares in the plain of Thessaly (the whole of the Thessalian plain up to the contour line +200m) as compared to the 200,000 ha. presently irrigated (highest rate of irrigation in Greece). Contributing to the water supply of the urban areas of Larissa, Trikala, Volos etc. Replenishing the overexploited aquifer of the Thessalian plain. Increasing the flow of the highly polluted Pinios river, and Partially restoring Lake Karla which had been drained in the 60's to create agricultural land with disastrous results on the environment and the hydrology of the area. Power production was considered to be only a beneficial side effect which could have been achieved anyway by harnessing Acheloos on its natural course. History of the diversion project: --------------------------------- The diversion of Acheloos was first proposed in the 1950's. Later in the 1970's studies from 2 companies SNC (Canada) and Electro-Watt (Switzerland) concluded Thessaly could be irrigated using local water resources with appropriate management and the construction of reservoirs. In 1972, a Public Power Corporation (PPC) engineer proposed a new scheme for the diversion (which closely resembles the current scheme). In 1978, an inter-ministerial committee was set up to examine the irrigation problem of Thessaly. It was concluded that Thessaly would be short of 1 billion cubic metres of water by the year 2000 and proposed the examination of various solutions including the diversion of Acheloos. In 1983, the prime minister (Mr. Andreas Papandreou) announced the Government's decision to proceed with the diversion of Acheloos. In 1984, the PPC was asked to work out a preliminary design for the whole project (which was completed in 2 months). In 1985, the PPC was asked to conduct all relevant studies and to organize the initial tender for the different project components with the beginning of 1993 set as the date of completion of the project. In 1987, seven consortia expressed interest and six were prequalified. Later in the same year, Bechtel International was commissioned to prepare the terms of the final tendering procedure. In the meantime, the PPC proceeded with the construction of one of the proposed dams (Mesohora), partly financed from the Integrated Mediterranean Program (IMP) of the EC, which was to be built independently of the diversion. In 1988, Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd London and the Investment Bank SA Athens were commisioned to conduct an economic feasibility study which was completed in 1988. PROJECT DESCRIPTION: -------------------- The project is divided in two parts: the "Head" works and the Land Improvement works. "Head" Works ------------ a) 2 dams and reservoirs in upper Acheloos basin at Mesohora and Sykia b) 2 dams and reservoirs in Pinios basin (western Thessaly) at Pili and Mouzaki c) Tunnels for the transfer of water from the above to Thessaly plain 1. Messohora to Sykia 8 km long, diameter 4.5 m 2. Sykia to Mouzaki 18.5 km long, dm. 6 m 3. Pili to Mouzaki 8 km long, dm.3 m 4. Mouzaki to reservoir at Mavromati 3.9 km long, dm. 6.8 m d) Hydro-Electric power stations at: 1. Messohora 140 MW 2. Sykia 60 MW 3. Pefkofito 160 MW 4. Mouzaki 270 MW 5. Mavromati 30 MW Land Improvement Works ---------------------- a) Diverted water stabilization resevoir at Mavromati b) Collection, storage and regulation works for the water of the Thessaly basins c) Water transfer works from Mavromati to local reservoirs d) Flood prevention works e) Irrigation and drainage works f) Central water pump stations and other works in support of the irrigation network The works are designed for a maximum water diversion of 1.1 - 1.3 x 109 m3. In all, 380.000 hectares will be irrigated including about 200.000 ha. that are now irrigated by groundwater abstraction and from the Tavropos reservoir. In 1989, the terms of the final tendering process were announced. They covered all components of the project: dams, reservoirs, hydro-electric works, irrigation works etc. Only one consortium, Tayeuro, applied. Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd was one of the Tayeuro associates. The other 5 did not agree with the terms of the tendering process because, as they stated in writing, the lack of detailed preliminary studies and the complicated nature of the project made it impossible to make any credible and mutually beneficial offer. In 1990, the Greek government decided to investigate the possibilities for EEC funding for part of the Project (H/E works). The aim was to secure 30% (100 MECUs) Community funding for the projects of Sykia and the diversion tunnel. It finally decided (30.03 2E90) to include the H/E of Sykia, the main diversion tunnel and the H/E of Pefkofito in an application for funding under the Community Support Framework. 80 million ECUs were allocated under the 1989-1993 CSF. Disbursement of the CSF funds is conditional on the approval by the Commission of the relevant operational programmes, which have not yet been presented by the Greek Government. Additional funding (20 MECUs) for Sykia and the main diversion tunnel was granted under the Greek IMPs. On 9.2.1990, the government asked Tayeuro to extend its 1989 bid offer, which it did on 9.7.1990. In the summer of 1990, the Greek Government pronounced its acceptance of = Tayeuro's bid offer and its decision to proceed with the construction of the "Head works". Ho= wever, because the Tayeuro price that corresponded to that part of the project (116 billion = GRD) was deemed excessive, a committee was set up by the Ministry of Environment, the PPC= and the Ministry of Agriculture to decide on a more reasonable price. The PPC recommended = 80 bn GRD and the Ministry of Environment 96 bn GRD. On 26.11.1991, the Minister of National Economy formed another committee = to prepare the contract for the approved works (approved for funding under the Structura= l Funds) which would then have to be ratified by the Greek Parliament. The opinion of the Tech= nical Chamber of Greece would be requested before approval. A deadline was set for 16.11.1= 991 but it was not respected. The Greek government announced several times throughout 1992 the impendin= g signing of the contract with the Tayeuro consortium. However, the contract was not signe= d apparently due to differences over the price and Tayeuro's differences with its sub-contrac= tors. The standing committee of the Bern convention in its annual meeting (30.1= 1.92 -04.12.92) at Strasbourg issued a recommendation (No38-1992) calling the Greek governme= nt to ensure that more comprehensive environmental impact studies be carried out in order t= o safeguard the Messologi wetlands. Opposition to the project is swelling among Greek MPs. Two parliamentary = questions were submitted in late February 1993. = The contract between the Greek government and Tayeuro was signed on the 2= 2nd of March 1993 with the caveat that Tayeuro would sort out its differences with its sub-= contractors within 15 days. The contract was finalized in the spring of 1993 The agreed price w= as 83 billion drs (1988 prices). The contract was for the construction of the Sykia dam and the d= iversion tunnel. = Ratification of the Tayeuro contract by the Greek parliament was stopped = at the last minute, in August 1994, due to the intervention of the Commission of the European un= ion which objected to the bidding procedures. = Following the elections of October 1993 the new Pasok government abandonn= ed permanently the tayeuro contract and announced its intention to organize new bids. In the spring of 1994 the Greek NGOs fighting the project take legal acti= on at the Council of State, the highest administrative court with powers to overturn governmen= t decisions based on their compliance to the constitution and relevant national and internatio= nal law and conventions. = THE ECONOMICS OF THE ACHELOOS RIVER DIVERSION PROJECT The only feasibility study for the diversion of Acheloos and the developm= ent of the Thessaly plain (diversion project) was carried out by Morgan Grenfell & Co. Ltd (L= ondon) and the Investment Bank S.A (Athens). The Morgan Grenfell (M.G) study was complet= ed in two months and has several weaknesses. It is based on old, and frequently out= dated, data; It utilizes simplistic methods of analysis; It ignores several important soc= ial, environmental and economic factors and it does not examine the secondary and multiplier eff= ects of the project. The M.G study itself evaluates the diversion project to be marginally fea= sible under strongly contested pre-conditions thereby proving indirectly its uneconomic charac= ter. Project costs =04 The total investment cost of the diversion project was estimated= by M.G at 581.8 bln dr. (1988 prices) on the condition that all components (headworks = and irrigation infrastructure) would be constructed simultaneously and within a s= pecific time frame. The partial construction of parts of the project and the violation= of all time limits raises the construction costs and alters the terms of its evaluati= on. = =04 The financing requirements for the project were calculated by M.= G on the basis of unrealistic assumptions about inflation and exchange rates. It is = indicative that the inflation rate predicted for 1992 (9%) is almost half the real, an= d the current exchange rate to the US$ is the one predicted by M.G for the year 2003. =04 Fundamental cost factors which should have been included in the = calculation of investment costs were omitted. Among the costs not taken into cons= ideration are: -the cost of environmental protection and rehabilitation, = -the loss of existing economic infrastructure and productive activ= ities, -the cost of resettling the communities affected by the project, -the expropriation cost for private property affected by the proje= ct, -the construction cost of new roads and other infrastructure, -the cost of the necessary flood control works on Pinios river in = Thessaly, -the impact on agricultural production in Aitoloakarnania, = -the impact on fisheries' production at Acheloos' delta. =04 These omissions influence to an important degree the real invest= ment cost of the diversion project. Expropriation costs alone, may amount to 4-6% o= f the total investment cost. A more realistic estimate of the total investment= cost would exceed 800 bln dr. (1988 prices). It is also important to note that in Gr= eece the final investment cost of large public projects is usually 1,5 to 2 times= higher than projected, in constant prices. =04 In its cost-benefit analysis of the diversion project M.G omitte= d the cost of the necessary infrastructure projects in Thessaly for the storage, pro= cessing and transport of the increased agricultural production (roads, port facilities, = regular and refrigerated storage facilities, packing and processing industries etc.). Most = of these costs are assumed to be born by the private sector. On the other hand, the i= ncome from the sale of the increased agricultural production is counted as a benefit t= o the national economy. =04 An additional cost factor omitted by M.G in its calculation of t= he direct production cost the expected important rise in land values. This is important= due to the large extent of land rentals (30-40%) in Greek agriculture (attributed t= o the fragmentation and small size of land holdings). It is estimated that 10-12 bln d= r. will be transferred annually from producers to landowners if M.G's predictions materia= lize. = =04 The importance of these omissions becomes apparent when seen in = the light of M.G's own estimate that a 15% increase in investment costs would make th= e project uneconomic. = Feasibility of M.G's predictions M.G predicts the benefits from the increase in agricultural production to= amount to 151,1 bln dr., which corresponds to 82,1% of the annual benefits of the whole proje= ct. The importance of the agricultural sector is highlighted by the fact that M.G predicts t= hat a 15% decline in the expected prices or productivity, or a delay of three years in the achieve= ment of the predicted productivity increase would make the project uneconomic. The M.G study di= d not examine the impact on the feasibility of the diversion project from the combined = effect of these scenarios. = M.G's predictions of the agricultural benefits of the diversion project r= est on a series of assumptions which are debatable and unfounded: =04 Most of Thessaly's agricultural products and especially those wh= ose production will increase with the diversion project (cotton, tobacco, sugar beets,= dairy products) will be affected by the proposed changes in the Common Agricultural Pol= icy (CAP) of the EC as well as the GATT negotiations. However, such changes were no= t taken into consideration by the M.G study. Instead it was assumed that Thessa= ly's produce could be absorbed in their entirety by the European and international ma= rkets at prices comparable to the high prices of year 1986. =04 The M.G study uses a period of 25 years to calculate the economi= c and financial feasibility of the project. Methodologically this choice is debata= ble. If a 50 year period had been chosen instead, which corresponds to the real life time o= f the project, then the predicted marginal feasibility of the project would be even sm= aller. =04 The calculation of the agricultural benefits of the diversion pr= oject was based on the assumption that the irrigated lands would be cultivated fully (100= %) and with maximum effectiveness. However, in the existing irrigation schemes= of Thessaly the average rate of land utilization is below 80%. =8Boreover, 100% la= nd utilization is not practiced anywhere in the world. It is a common agricultural pract= ice worldwide to let agricultural land fallow periodically in order to avoid its exhaus= tion and degradation. =04 Another unfounded assumption is that the cost of agricultural in= puts will remain stable during the 25 years span of the M.G study. However, intensive agri= culture requires increasing inputs over time due to the degradation of the soil's n= atural fertility and regeneration capacity. Besides, agricultural production costs have= doubled in the last two years due to the liberalization of the agro-chemical market. =04 According to M.G the private on-farm investments needed to take = advantage of the irrigation infrastructure in the project area amount to 65,6 bln d= r. in a period of ten years (1988 prices). Besides the fact this cost factor is underest= imated by 10-35 bln dr, M.G assumes Thessaly farmers will be able and willing to inves= t that amount. In practice this means that for 10 years Thessaly's farmers will have= to invest yearly 264% more than usual. In this way Thessaly's share in total privat= e on-farm investments in Greece will increase from 10% to 27% in a decade. T= hese predictions are obviously completely unrealistic especially since the trend in= the last 15 years has been for the levels of private agricultural investments to fall. = = =04 For the achievement of its predictions M.G estimates the necessa= ry employment increase to correspond to 56.000 full-time workers. This implies a= radical reversal of long term trends in Greek agriculture such as the gradual decline = of number of persons employed per farm and the increase of multi-employment in = the rural sector (part-time farmers). It is indicative that despite the radical inc= rease of agricultural production in Thessaly in the past 25 years the number of persons = fully employed in agriculture has fallen by approximately 30%. =04 For the construction of the irrigation infrastructure in Thessal= y M.G estimates it will be necessary to invest 336 bln dr in a period of ten years. This m= eans that during a decade it will be necessary to invest yearly in Thessaly alone mor= e than double the amount spent for irrigation and land improvements in the whole of = Greece. =04 According to M.G's predictions 22.000 hectares of land will be i= ncluded yearly in the project area (upon completion of irrigation infrastructure) for a = period of ten years. This amounts to an area 1,5-2 times larger than the area turned ov= er to irrigation projects in the whole of Greece. The lack of realism that characte= rizes these assumptions is highlighted by the fact that much smaller irrigatio= n projects in Greece are constructed as a rule later than any timetable predicts thus r= esulting in higher construction and operation costs. =04 Thessaly's production covers to a large extent Greece's quotas f= or products such as cotton (53%), sugar beets (30%) and tobacco (23%). An increase in = the production as predicted by M.G will unavoidably lead to a huge increase in the d= uties levied under the regime of co-responsibility, which will burden all Greek produ= cers and/or the institution of national quota measures in order to safeguard the i= ncome of all farming regions. In either case the results of the project are self-defeat= ing in economic terms. In social terms they are potentially explosive since they will lea= d to increased inter- regional conflict over national quota shares and aggravation of th= e existing regional inequalities. =04 To pay off the debt dues M.G assumes that 50% of gross output (1= 51.1/2=3D75,5 bln drs) will be returned to the state, mainly through taxes and dutie= s. This assumption is completely out of line with the reality of Greek agriculture. As a= n example it can be noted that taxation of Gross Agricultural Income is less than 0.6 = per thousand. Indeed, if one adds the 60 bln drs that M.G estimates to be the di= rect cost of production which corresponds to the gross value of incremental agr= icultural production of 151.1 bln drs, then the stupendous phenomenon occurs whereby M.= G itself NEGATES the project's expected benefit to Thessaly's farmers. =04 Finally, it should be noted that the achievement of M.G's foreca= sts pre-supposes a revolution in Thessaly's agricultural economy in terms of planning= and technical and scientific support to the farmers. No effort in this direction is = foreseen by M.G, nor has this cost factor been accounted for in the cost evaluation of = the project. ENERGY PRODUCTION =04 The Hydro-electric benefits of the project are far from guarante= ed. The PPC (=83=84=86) has demanded 140 bln drs compensation for the losses it will incur= due to the reduced potential of the existing dams on Acheloos and the opportunity cos= t from the cancellation of more productive H/E projects on Acheloos' course.= =04 The dams will have a very short life span due to geological cond= itions in the project sites (land slides, erosion).The Messohora and Pili dams will be u= seless in less than 50 years. = =04 The average Thessaly farmer consumes almost twice as much electr= ical energy as the average Greek farmer. Also electrical energy consumption in Thessa= ly is 20% higher than the rest of Greece. The proposed agro-industrial development = of Thessaly will no doubt raise energy demands, thus widening the gap between Thessaly= and other less developed areas even further. =04 Acheloos' diversion will not benefit the national energy balance= =2E Relative to its size the Greek economy is extremely energy consuming. Especially in the= industrial sector energy consumption per unit of product is higher in Greece than in= the USA. Overall, the Greek economy is 7-40% more energy consuming than most develop= ed countries. The main reason for this is the lack of any effort to increase eff= iciency in energy use and reduce consumption. Incentives to reduce over-consumption and = inefficiency would generate more, cheaper and environmentally friendly energy w= ith minimum investment. = WATER MANAGEMENT One of the basic arguments of the proponents of the diversion project is = Thessaly's "hydrological poverty". However, much of the data used is inconclusive an= d of debatable quality. Moreover, different public agencies give different estimates of = Thessaly's resources. In any case all available official data indicates that Thessaly has enoug= h water resources of its own. The real problem seems to be bad water management practices. =04 Depending on the source (Ministry of Energy and Natural resource= s, Min. of Agriculture, Geological Institute) Thessaly's surface and ground w= ater resources range between 5.4 and 3.8 bln m3/year without counting the Tavropos sche= me contribution (100-200 m3/year). =04 =92he total water needs of Thessaly (irrigation, drinking, indus= try) in present conditions are estimated at 1-1.2 bln m3/year by the Ministry of Agriculture = and the Geological Institute. According to M.G the total water needs in the year 2037= will reach 2.3 bln m3/year. = =04 Irrigation needs in Thessaly have been overistimated due to the = use of outdated techniques. Recent studies have concluded that irrigation needs in= Thessaly are 38% lower than estimated by M.G. Adjusted to these findings total wate= r needs in Thessaly (irrigation, drinking, industry) in the year 2037 will not exceed = 1.5 m3/year, 36% less than calculated during the planning of the diversion project. =04 Water shortages in Thessaly are primarily due to bad management = practices. The primary example is the draining of lake Karla in the mid-sixties w= hich has resulted in the drop of groundwater levels. Water shortages in Thessaly are se= asonal and are directly linked to the height of the summer season. In the winter = time 88% of lake Karla's and 71% of Pinios' runoff (a total 2.2 bln m3/year) flows = to the sea. = =04 The crops whose production will be expanded in Thessaly (especia= lly cotton) are extremely water consuming. The irrigation techniques to be used ar= e also very inefficient and wasteful. According to M.G 93% of the project area= will be irrigated using water canon sprinklers, a method which leads to the evaporat= ion of 30-40% of the water before it reaches the ground in hot climates like that o= f Thessaly. This means that approximately 600 million cubic meters of water will be= literally blown in the wind. =04 The irrigation needs of Thessaly could be met without the divers= ion of Acheloos and at a smaller economic, environmental and social cost. According to= the Ministry of Agriculture the construction of projects pending for a number of y= ears would allow the irrigation of 350,000 hectares, a little more than the Acheloo= s scheme, using exclusively local water resources. =92he adoption of more efficien= t irrigation methods could also ensure the sustainable use of Thessaly's water resource= s into the future. = ACHELOOS' HYDROLOGY = =04 The lack of definitive published hydrometric data for the Achelo= os basin impedes analysis. The apparent lack of a monograph or catchment review doc= ument for the hydrology of the Acheloos is a major handicap to the sound managem= ent of the river and its resources. =04 There is a need to examine the Acheloos flow data in detail to e= stablish the degree of reliability that can be placed in it. The reliability of data coll= ected before 1965 seems to be the most pressing research question in this area. =04 Given the existing data from several sources, the flow in the Ac= heloos is not, and never has been, as much as an average of 5 109m3 per year. Flows i= n the period 1950-84 were higher than in the years 1966-91. The average flow fr= om 1950 to 1991 was 4.41 109m3. The flow during 1966 to 1991 averaged 3.6 109m3. T= he years 1985 to 1991 had an average flow of just over 3 109m3 per year. =04 The flow in the Acheloos that was used in the 1989 EIA study for= the delta (Ministries, 1989) seems to be significantly larger than the figur= es being used by the Public Power Corporation in Greece. =04 The hydrological data, upon which the EIA study of the delta is = based, seems to be deficient. The study appears to neglect evaporative and infiltrati= on losses from the 161.8 km2 of reservoirs that will be created on the Acheloos. Evap= orative losses from the reservoirs (c180 106m3/year) will be around 3.6% of the flow i= n the river in wet years and 6% in dry years. =04 Inter-annual storage in the reservoirs will augment flow in the = river in dry periods and reduce flow in times of spate. There has been no analysis as yet, = and none is presently possible until data is released, of the effect of the da= ms on flood flows along the Acheloos. =04 A formal estimate of the feasibility of diverting different quan= tities of water from Sykia to Thessaly cannot be provided with the limited data availab= le and the minimal information circulated on the operational characteristics of the S= ykia reservoir. A preliminary simulation suggests that diversions to Thessaly of bet= ween 25 and 35 m3/sec (788 106m3 and 1103 106m3 per year) are feasible but that t= heir guaranteed availability varies from almost 100% to 86%. If data for the droug= ht of the 1980s and early 1990s were available for Sykia, the conclusions of this anal= ysis would certainly indicate smaller volumes of transfer being feasible and/or a much = lower guaranteed availability. =04 Whilst it is generally stated that the diversion to Thessaly wil= l be 20% of the flow of the Acheloos, the planned diversion of 35 m3/sec would have repres= ented, at least, 33% of the river flow into the delta during the years 1950 to 1984= =2E This percentage is based upon Ministries (1989) figures corrected to allow for reserv= oir evaporation (180 106m3/year) and the diversion of river water for irrigation at Str= atos II (269 106m3/year). In addition, it has been shown that the flows cited b= y Ministries (1989) are larger than those used by other authorities in Greece. =04 The diversion as a percentage of the flow into the delta varies = from year to year. For 1950 to 1984, there are four years when the diversion is over 40% = and only two years when the diversion is less than 25% of the flow into the del= ta. The percentage figures would be much larger if data for the dry years following 1= 985 were available. = =04 A preliminary estimate of the diversion as a percentage of the f= low downstream of Kastraki for 1950 to 1991 is 39%. Using information for 1950 to 19= 91, there are only nine years out of the forty one when the diversion is less than 30= % and it is calculated to have been over 65% from 1986/7 to 1990/91. During 1988/89 and 1= 989/90 the diversion was equivalent to over 90% of the flow downstream of Kas= traki. =04 The impact of the five dams and the diversion to Thessaly on the= flow regime of the Acheloos has been analyzed theoretically by Ministries (1989). The= y showed a marked reduction in winter flows with discharge during June to September = being maintained under normal circumstances. The reduction in the peaks of individu= al winter hydrographs is likely to have been much greater than that calculat= ed for average monthly flows. =04 There is a diurnal cycle of flows in the lower Acheloos with the= majority of the day having virtually zero flow. This is related to the morning and eve= ning peaks in demand for electricity. = =04 Only theoretical data exists to describe and forecast the flow r= egime of the river under future management conditions, it is essential that an analysis be = undertaken of actual flow regimes to assess the nature of real operational decisions at= the existing dams. An analysis of the operation of the dams during the 1988-91 drough= t is especially important. =04 The implementation of an optimal flow regime in the lower part o= f the Acheloos requires a series of steps involving hydrological studies; investi= gations of ecological systems, agriculture, fisheries etc.; the definition of limiting v= alues for hydrological parameters such as water level and flow rate for different times o= f the year; simulation studies to determine the practicality of achieving these limits; n= egotiation for a change in operating rules for major hydraulic structures; and the creatio= n of a structure to implement the agreements achieved to guarantee multi-purpose opera= tion of the hydraulic structures. =04 The implementation of a restored flow regime to the lower Achelo= os would be an economic development project for coastal and lagoon fisheries, gra= zing, agriculture, tourism and global nature conservation. = =04 The lack of any hydrological or hydrogeological data or studies = for the Messolonghi wetland complex makes it impossible to demonstrate scientifically = the role of the rivers Acheloos and Evinos in nourishing the wetlands. It is not p= ossible to say with any certainty which of the several sources of freshwater is most i= mportant. However, the Acheloos delivers each year between 2 and 8 109m3 of water to = the wetland complex that it has constructed with its sediment and the Evinos h= as generated a further 0.4 109m3. As such it is unlikely that these two rivers ar= e not a major source of freshwater for the wetlands. ORNITHOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF ACHELOOS' DELTA AND THE MESSOLONGI WETLANDS =04 The delta of the Acheloos River and the Messolonghi wetlands com= plex constitutes a region of enormous interest for the preservation of wild birds on = the national, European and international level. =04 The region is included among the eleven (11) Greek wetlands of i= nternational importance that are protected by the Ramsar International Conventi= on. In addition, a part of the wetlands network has been designated a "Region of spec= ial protection", according to the EEC directive 79/409 on the protection of wild bi= rds. Approximately 90 of the species mentioned in appendix I of the directive are fou= nd or nest in the region, while at least five of them are threatened with extinction= =2E = =04 The region constitutes an important wintering place for large bi= rd populations. The populations of the following species: Coot (Fulica atra, Slender-b= illed Gull (Larus genei), Great White Egret(Egretta alba), Cormorant (Phalacrocorax = carbo), Pochard (Aythya ferina) and Wigeon (Anas penelope) exceed the criterion of= 1% of their population, thus making the region internationally important from = the ornithological point of view =04 The region is a migration station for many bird species, a nesti= ng place for rare waterfowl and waders and a habitat for many species of raptors. ORNITHOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MESSOLONGI WETLANDS Resting and wintering ground a) For migratory birds like: Fulica atra(Coot, Foulque macroule, Blasshuhn) and Larus genei(Slender-billed gull, Goeland railleur, Dunnschnabelmowe); b) For rare and endangered species like: Numenius tenuirostris(Slender-billed curlew, Courlis a bec grele, Dunnsch= nabell- brachvogel) Pelecanus crispus (Dalmatian Pelican, Pelican frise, Krayfskopfpelikan) Pelecanus onocrotalus(White pelican, Pelican blanc, Rosapelikan) Egretla alba(Great white egret, Grande aigrette, Silberreiher) Phalacrocorax carbo(Cormorant, Grand cormoran, Kormoran); c) For threatened raptors like: Aegypius monachus(Black vulture, Vautour moine, Monchsgeier) Circus cyaneus (Hen harrier, Busard Saint-Martin, Kornweihe) Aquila clanga(Spotted eagle, Aigle criard, Schelladler) Aquila heliaca(Imperial eagle, Aigle imperial, Kaiseradler) Falco perigrinus(Peregrine, Faucon pelerin, Wanderfalke) Nesting and breeding ground a) For wetland birds like: Ixobrychus minutus (Little bittern, Butor blongios, Zwergdommel) Ciconia ciconia(White stork, Cigogne blanche, Wei=FEstorch) Himantopus himantopus (Black-winged stilt, Echasse blanche, Stelzenlaufer= ) Recurvirostra avosetta (Avocet, Avocette, Sabelschnabler) Burhinus oedicnemus(Stone curlew, Oedicneme criard, Triel) Glareola pratincola (Praticole, Glareole a collier, Brachschwalbe); b) For raptors like: Gyps fulvus (Griffon vulture, Vautour fauve, Gansegeier) Circaetus gallicus (Short-toed eagle, Circaete Jean-le-Blanc, Schlangenad= ler) Aquila pomarina (Lesser spotted eagle, Aigle pomarin, Schreiadler) Bubo bubo (Eagle owl, Hibou grand-duc, Uhu) __________________________________________________________ = Based on 1) RSPB, "Preliminary report on an important bird area under threat"= , report updated August 1991 2) Vassilakis, K. & Bousbouras, D., The Diversion of Acheloos. Environmental, Economic and Social Consequences, The Hellenic Ornithologi= cal Society, Athens, October 1991=0CENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS Thessaly plain =04 The intensification of agricultural activities will result in in= creased agro-chemical pollution loads in surface and ground water, and the coastal zone.= = =04 Degradation of the natural regeneration capacity and humus conte= nt of the soil due to the intensification of agricultural activity. In the long term thi= s will lead to increased soil erosion, especially in the 70.000 hectares of sloped lands. = =04 Salinization of the soil due to the combination of increased irr= igation and the warmer climatic conditions. =04 Appearance of new crop diseases, especially fungal diseases due = to increased humidity. This will induce increased application of agro-chemicals= =2E =04 Climatic changes due to the combination of greater humidity and = the high temperatures of the area (among the highest in Greece). Lower Acheloos basin The reduction of water flow in lower Acheloos basin will have many interr= elated repercussions. =04 Climatic change towards dryer conditions. =04 Movement inland of the zone of mixing between fresh and sea wate= r at the mouth of the river. =04 Drop of groundwater levels and greater intrusion of sea water. =04 Increased concentration of organic pollutants, heavy metals and = agro-chemical pollution loads at the delta of the river. =04 At the Messolongi wetlands, expansion of the halophile vegetatio= n inland at the expense of the already limited stands of reeds and canes. =04 Change in the salinity levels, temperature, and dissolved oxygen= content of the Messolongi lagoon. =04 Disturbance of benthic life and of the composition of the fish p= opulation of the lagoons. =04 Loss of habitat for various species of birds (ducks, coots, hero= ns, etc.). Upper Acheloos basin =04 Radical alteration of the geography of the Acheloos drainage bas= in and of the river itself. Of the 220 km of the river only 60 will remain. =04 Degradation of the remaining riverine ecosystem due to irregular= ities in flow. =04 Massive destruction of riparian vegetation and water pollution d= uring the construction stage (already happening). =04 Loss of habitat due to the inundation of vast tracts of forested= land. =04 Disappearance of certain species like Lutra lutra (otter), Cincl= us cinclus (dipper) and Salmo truta (trout) SOCIAL REPERCUSSIONS =04 The diversion project will result in the forced uprooting of the= local population from its ancestral lands. A way of life and one of the last living exam= ples of a mountain culture in harmony with the natural environment will be lost. =04 The creation of long reservoirs will have a negative impact on t= he social cohesion of the areas as communication between remaining settlements will be d= isrupted. This disruption will also affect negatively the local economy. =04 The diversion project will result in the aggravation of the demo= graphic erosion in one of the most sensitive and neglected areas of Greece. A wave of env= ironmnetal refugees will be forced to migrate to urban areas thus stifling ho= pes for a balanced regional development. =04 The investment og huge sums of money in an already developed are= of Greece will accentuate regional inequalities. Thessaly's farmers are among the= richest in Greece. On the other hand, the mountain and economies of the sensitive bo= rder areas is degraded. =04 The inundation of large areas of land will have a destructive im= pact on the cultural heritage of the Pindus mountain range. Some of the oldest stone ar= ch bridges, byzantine monasteries, and cobble trails used for many centuries w= ill be lost forever. This cultural heritage could become the nucleus for the economic r= evival of the mountain communities of Pindus. = =0C