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dam-l LS: Omvedt Discussion Part 5/6 - Himanshu Thakker Response
A Response to Gail Omvedt's Articles on Sardar Sarovar and Large dams
By Himanshu Thakker
4 Sep 1999
Part I.
SARDAR SAROVAR AND BOMB
"For some time past, however, I have been beginning to think that we are
suffering from what we may call, "disease of gigantism"...... We have to realise
that we can also meet our problems much more rapidly and efficiently by taking
up a large number of small schemes, especially when the time involved in a small
scheme is much less and the results obtained are rapid. Further in those small
schemes you can get a good deal of what is called public co-operation, and
therefore, there is that social value in associating people with such small
schemes."
Jawaharlal Nehru, Nov. 17, 1958
Gail Omvedt needs to be taken seriously for many reasons. More than anything
else, there are very few other than those who have a vested interest in large
dams who are prepared to defend large dams. Gail is one of those few persons.
It is significant that the Gujarat Government has chosen to highlight Gail's
writing in it's campaign against the Peoples' movement in the Narmada Valley. It
is not for nothing that three out of the twelve items in the Current Happenings
section of the Sardar Sarovar Nigam web site these days happen to be authored
by Gail Omvedt.
To begin with, let me make some facts clear. Though I am not writing this on
behalf of the NBA, I can categorically say that the NBA is not against
development in general and irrigation in particular. Any suggestion to the
contrary is misleading and bigoted. It is part of NBA's case that there is need
for an expeditious solution to the genuine water problems of Kutch and
Saurashtra. However, why look for 2% or 9% solutions? The Sardar Sarovar Project
(SSP), even on paper, is going to benefit only 1.6% of the cultivable area of
Kutch and 9% of the cultivable area of Saurashtra. Let us assume for the moment
(this is a very heroic assumption, as we shall shortly see) that the SSP will
actually deliver what it says it will. Even than, how will the genuine needs of
the remaining 98.4% cultivable area of Kutch and 91% of the cultivable area of
Saurashtra be met? Gujarat officials tell us that for these remaining areas,
they will implement alternative solutions.
Now surely if 'alternative solutions' are good enough for 98% of an area,
they're good enough for the remaining 2%?
Remember that Gujarat got more than it's share of the Narmada waters (9 Million
Acre Feet (MAF)) from the Narmada Waters Dispute Tribunal only because it
claimed that it had more drought prone areas than Madhya Pradesh had. In fact,
Gujarat said before the Tribunal that it wanted to irrigate 11 lakh acres of
cultivable area in Kutch with Narmada waters. Today, even on paper, the SSP
includes only 1 lakh acres from Kutch in its projected command. So much for
Gujarat's concerns for drought prone areas. However, the point critics of SSP
are making is far more serious. It can be shown from facts and figures that the
SSP will not deliver the benefits it claims to deliver for Gujarat's real
drought prone areas like Kutch, Saurashtra and North Gujarat.
Firstly, the whole project is based on flawed hydrology. As Madhya Pradesh has
said in its petition before the Supreme Court, the Narmada has only 22.5 MAF of
water as annual flow at 75% dependability as against the assumption of 28 MAF of
water. Thus, as per the Tribunal order, Gujarat's share from Narmada water will
drop by 19.5%, in proportion. The sufferers of this drop will be the areas of
Kutch, Saurashtra and North Gujarat, which are at the tail end of Narmada
Canals.
Secondly, the SSP assumes that an irrigation efficiency of 60% will be achieved.
Now this is based on highly unrealistic assumptions. One only has to look at
irrigation efficiencies achieved in India till date. As per the India Irrigation
Sector report of the World Bank (1991), no project in India has achieved more
than 36% irrigation efficiency. Thus, realistically, at least one third of the
projected command will not get irrigation waters. Who will suffer in the process
except the tail enders?
Thirdly, if the available water in the SSP is to be spread over 18 lakh ha as
projected, the project cannot provide more than 525 mm of water on an average.
With SSP's assumption of 60% efficiency, this would mean about 320 mm of water
to the plants. With this amount of water, it would be difficult to grow anything
more than wheat in most parts of the SSP command. But the Gujarat Government has
given licenses and is actively promoting at least ten sugar factories in initial
region of the SSP command. Sugarcane in these regions require between 2000 and
3000 mm of water. It is true that in the initial period of the SSP's operation,
when the canal network in the rest of the command would be unbuilt, there will
be abundant water for the initial regions, as the World Bank's staff appraisal
report (1985) has noted. But once the central Gujarat regions of Baroda,
Bhroach, Khaira and Ahmedabad establish needs and create lobby to fulfil them,
can any power stop them from continuing to take the waters they want?
Fourthly, the SSP as planned now has no allocation of water for any urban, rural
or industrial use south of the Sabarmati River. But large towns like Baroda and
Ahemedabad have already made and sanctioned plans to take water from the Narmada
waters for their use. In fact, the implementation of the Baroda plan has
reportedly already started. Five star hotels and luxurious water parks are being
promoted along the Narmada Canal to raise finances for the project. Huge
industries and industrial estates are coming up in these regions, all based on
the assumption of availability of waters from the Narmada. When all these
politically and economically powerful interests manage to corner the Narmada
waters for their use, whose share will they be taking?
Fifthly, there is 150 kms of river downstream of the Sardar Sarovar dam. There
is a rich estuary in this region. This region also needs water for domestic,
industrial, agriculture, fisheries, navigation and environmental (to push back
the salinity ingress) uses. When Gujarat was presenting its case before the
Tribunal, it said that the state needed 0.7 MAF of water for the downstream
areas. The Tribunal, while allocating 9 MAF to Gujarat, said that Gujarat was
free to use its share of water, as it found fit, including using it for
downstream uses. In the present SSP plans, Gujarat has allocated the whole of
its share of water from the Narmada River to the command area. No water is
allocated for downstream areas! Because the Narmada is a monsoon fed river,
80-90% of its annual water flows away in the four monsoon months. Thus, the SSP,
with its live storage capacity of 4.73 MAF, may spill some water in the monsoon
months, but it will spill no water in the non-monsoon months. And the demands of
the downstream region being strong and justified, Gujarat will have to allocate
water for these regions out of its share and this will again be at the expense
of tail-end regions.
One can go on like this with further arguments. In this series, one of the most
important arguments is the financial one. The History of large projects in India
shows that the project authorities consistently deflate the costs of the
projects to get them sanctioned. Ultimate project costs are invariably in
multiples of the original projected costs. This is already proving to be the
case with the SSP. When the Planning Commission sanctioned the project, the
project cost was estimated at Rs. 6406 crores at constant prices and at 13,000
crores at current prices. Now the project authorities agree that the project
cost will not be less than Rs. 20,000 crores. However, our estimates show that
the project cost will not be less than Rs. 44,000 crores. Here it is important
to note that of the total project cost, the most expensive part is the cost for
canal structures. Thus, the dam wall and the initial canals may get built, but
when the finances dry up, the sufferers will once again be the tail enders.
As far as the regions of Kutch and Saurashtra are concerned, the Gujarat
Government rhetoric is similar to Gail's: there is no alternative to the SSP for
these regions. But let us look at the facts once again. What is the average
annual precipitation in Saurashtra? A simple calculation of average rainfall in
Saurashtra shows that this figure is over 43 MAF. (Compare this with the amount
of water Saurashtra is to get even on paper from SSP: 3 MAF.) As per a report
from the Gujarat Land Development Corporation (a Gujarat Government body), 10-15
MAF of this is utilisable, but is flowing away unutilised today. And the GLDC
has come out with a plan as to how this water can be made utilisable in ten
years, in a decentralised way, at much lower costs than the SSP will ever
achieve for less than one third of these benefits.
Seven years back, a movement started in Saurashtra that is today known as the
well recharging movement. Entirely through people's efforts, three out of seven
lakh existing wells in that region have been recharged using a simple
technology. Existing streams fed by rain are diverted to existing wells via a
small sand filled pit that acts as filtration pit. The regions where this has
been done have seen a number of remarkable changes: the groundwater level has
come up, the salinity of water in coastal areas has gone down, water is
available for domestic uses throughout the year and in a number of places,
protective irrigation is available to crops at times of stress. The movement has
taken roots and is now digging up existing and new tanks to harvest and recharge
more rainwater. The govt., seeing the success of this, wanted to intervene, but
the people said politely, but firmly, "No, please. We do not want this
initiative to fail." This is not the only such example. A number of other
examples illustrating the feasibility of options can be found from across
Saurashtra and Kutch.
The tragedy for the people of Kutch and Saurashtra is that not only have they
been told for the last forty years that there is no alternative to the SSP for
them. But also that the govt. has no resources for options that are feasible and
much more cost effective and quicker for them. To add insult to injury, all
evidence shows that these regions may never get any water from the SSP.
If the Gujarat Govt. was really serious about solving the water problem in Kutch
and Saurashtra, one would have expected that along with building main canal,
they would first build the branch and other canals in Kutch, then in Saurashtra
and then in North Gujarat, followed by the central Gujarat region coming last.
This would ensure that the most needy areas, in whose name the whole project is
getting justified, would get first and assured benefit from SSP. A number of
independent people including the FMG (Five Member Group) review committee
appointed by the Govt. of India have recommended this. What do we find on
ground? The Govt.'s priority is exactly the reverse. Already water-wise (and
industrially, agriculturally, socially, economically and politically) resource
rich area of central Gujarat will have the first right to use Narmada waters.
And in their scheme of things, Kutch and Saurashtra are at the tail end of the
proposed canal. Would one need greater evidence to show the real intentions of
the Gujarat Govt.?
Now let us come to the question of the restructuring options of the SSP that
people like Joy, Paranjpe and Datye have put forward. This is a proposal that
suggests the Sardar Sarovar Dam should not be more than 107 mts high (as against
the projected height of 138.68 mts. It suggests how the needs of Kutch and
Saurashtra can be met with this, much lower dam, which would save upto 75% of
the projected submergence. It would mean that at least 300,000 people could be
saved from the trauma of displacement. (It is strange, is it not, that the
people who devised the proposal have not complained to NBA that the NBA has
neglected them.) The proposal, to begin with, was extensively discussed with the
NBA right from its formulation stage. It was made public in consultation with
the NBA. It was because of the NBA, the proposal got a hearing before bodies
like the FMG, and the FMG has not only taken note of the proposal, but has also
suggested in their reports to concerned governments to peruse the proposal. NBA
had full agreement with the main principles of the proposals, e.g. there should
be equitable distribution of water, that full use of local resources need to be
made first, etc. NBA brought to light this proposal wherever it could. The
proposal was made in 1995 when the dam was at 80.5 mts. The only point NBA made
was that any such alternative proposal should be taken to its logical conclusion
and to begin with, it should be explored as to how the structure constructed
till date can be put to use. It is also to be noted that the Joy-Paranjpe
proposal does not establish need for SSP. It only incorporates the SSP dam as
part of it is constructed. NBA's position is that if the principles underlying
the proposal are properly followed, there is no need for SSP.
So to conclude the first part of my argument, let us count the losses from the
SSP: Over half a million people displaced (including a very large proportion of
tribals and dalits), 39,000 ha of land and over 17,200 ha of forests destroyed,
over 1,87,000 ha of land taken for canal construction, over 150 kms of river
destroyed in the downstream area in addition to the destruction of river habitat
in the submergence zone, annual loss of fisheries in the estuarine area
amounting to over 12,000 tonnes, unknown other impacts in downstream area,
Destruction of wildlife habitat in the command area, loss of opportunities to
develop local water systems, over Rs. 44,000 crores of rupees, human rights
violations of unknown kinds and numbers. All for doubtful benefits for less that
one tenth of cultivable area in drought prone regions. Apart from these, the SSP
will create a potential of water logging and salinisation in the vast, as yet
unknown extent of command area.
And these impacts are only from the SSP. However, to realise the SSP benefits,
the SSP alone is not sufficient. Another, bigger and much more destructive dam
called the Narmada Sagar Project must come up in Madhya Pradesh. That project
will submerge 90,000 ha of land including 45,000 ha of forests and a total of
254 villages. While counting SSP's projected benefits, the costs from NSP must
be debited to the SSP.
Can any bomb do better?