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subject: LS: Some comments in reply to Ogden's claims
Some comments on statements made by Ogden in their April 7 reply to a
protest letter from Dan Silver. Thanks to everyone who took part in
Barrage Ogden Day which seems to have been very successful. They are
certainly being made aware of the opposition to this project. It will
be great if people who rang Ogden can follow up with letter.
Patrick
<excerpt>Ogden Energy Group
3211 Jermantown Road, Suite 300
Fairfax, VA 22030
Tel: 703-246-0600
Fax: 703-246-0808
April 7, 2000
Dear Mr. Silver:
This project will provide the people of the Mandaleshwar region with an
important new source of clean energy.
</excerpt>
The energy from Maheshwar Dam (Mandaleshwar is the nearest town to the
dam) will not be 'clean'. Because they trap a river's flow, dams foul
river water in numerous ways, affecting its chemistry, temperature, and
turbidity (sediment load). They also block fish migrations and alter
the natural pattern of floods and sediment flows. These hydrological,
chemical and physical changes have serious impacts on riverine and
floodplain flora and fauna which are adapted to the natural
characteristics of the river. According to a study by the World
Commission on Dams, dams are the main reason why an estimated 30-35% of
the world's freshwater fish species are extinct, endangered or
vulnerable.
The specific environmental impacts of the Maheshwar project are not
known as there has been no comprehensive environmental assessment. This
is a violation of both Indian and international standards for dam
projects. There has also been no assessment of the potential health
impacts of the project, such as an increase in malaria. Without a
detailed assessment of what the environmental impacts of the dam are
likely to be there can be no credible plan to mitigate or compensate
for these impacts.
<excerpt>The 400 megawatts generated at Shree
Maheshwar will supply the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board with peaking
power -- electricity that is generated for several hours each day
throughout most of the year to meet the demand that cannot be handled
by
existing facilities. During monsoon season, when larger facilities are
taken off-line for maintenance, Shree Maheshwar will help make up the
energy shortfall and ensure a constant source of power.
</excerpt>
Maheshwar dam will generate power for only 1-1.5 hours a day for 8
months of the year. Madhya Pradesh actually has a surplus of energy
during the four monsoon months (demand is lower due to reasons
including less demand for air conditioning and pumping of water).
Independent energy analysts who participated in a Task Force on the
Maheshwar project sponsored by the Madhya Pradesh (MP) government
estimate that its power will cost around four times the cost of power
currently produced in MP and will be among the most expensive in the
country. Project authorities have denied these allegations but refused
to provide their own detailed estimates of power costs.
The report of the Task Force recommended that work on the Maheshwar dam
should be halted and a fresh analysis of costs and benefits undertaken
to establish the viability of the Project. It suggested various
alternatives to the peaking power to be produced by the dam including
demand-management measures, biomass generation, optimum use of
oil-based plants and existing dams, and micro-hydro plants.
Under the proposed contractual arrangement for the project the Madhya
Pradesh government will have to pay a fixed sum (approximately Rs. 5bn
($115m) per annum) to the power company regardless of how much power
the dam actually generates and whether consumers are able to afford the
power. This will create a serious financial burden on the people of
Madhya Pradesh. Generation at Maheshwar is supposed to rely on water
released from a massive storage reservoir upstream (the Narmada Sagar
Project). This project is long delayed and unlikely to ever be
completed, and this will thus reduce the power produced at Maheshwar.
<excerpt>
In order to provide these benefits to the region, the project requires
the
relocation of families. But estimates used by the Narmada Bachao
Andolan
(NBA) and its United States counterpart, International Rivers Network
(IRN), are wrong-- by about three times the actual figure. The 2,500
families, or approximately 12,000 individuals, living in villages on
the
Narmada's banks will be compensated for their homes and land.
</excerpt>
Official data on resettlement numbers are filled with inconsistencies.
Several project documents claim that 2264 families will be resettled.
But even the incomplete official resettlement plan indicates that some
4,000 families would be affected. Independent reviews show that the
official figures are gross underestimates and based on outdated and
incomplete data. The official figures also ignore thousands of
non-landowners who would lose their livelihoods to the project
(including landless labourers, fisherpeople, and those dependent on
riverbed gravel quarrying). Recent surveys by the NBA suggest the true
number of people to lose land or livelihoods will be around 35-40,000.
In a 1998 report, the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) - the
premier social research institute in India, states that:
"The project documents do not make it clear what data constitutes the
basis of the people being counted as project affected. According to the
people no survey of the land, enumeration of the population and its
socio-economic and demographic condition has been done in the recent
years, let alone exclusively for the project. The last survey and land
settlement was reported as having taken place in the 1970s. As such
therefore the estimates of projected affected people and the categories
of land to be submerged are unreliable."
On the issue of the land supposedly available for resettlement, TISS
states that:
"A significant proportion of the area that the project will eventually
submerge is fertile agricultural land yielding three crops a year . . .
in lieu of this [land] the State proposes to give the project affected
people government waste land. The result can only mean impoverishment .
. . " TISS found that the government lands were eroded and stony and
already used by other poverty-stricken communities, and that claims of
private lands identified for resettlement were fictitious.
In response to criticism from TISS, project authorities carried out a
new survey of resettlement land in June 1988. Most of the lands
identified in this survey are described as "murrum" which means they
have gravel soils and are largely unfit for farming. The survey - like
previous surveys - is highly unreliable. An illustration of this is
that it mentions lands as available for resettlement which are slated
to be submerged under the Maheshwar and Sardar Sarovar reservoirs! It
also lists land for resettlement described as being on the "rocky bed
of river Beda".
The legal framework governing resettlement in MP clearly stipulates
that land lost to submergence must be compensated by grants of new
lands. As of today, the project authorities have not made a single
person an offer of cultivable land. Despite the legal provision for
'land-for-land', the project authorities are trying to intimidate
people to accept cash compensation by not offering them any land option
and committing various illegal acts like dumping stone on people's
land, and seizing lands arbitrarily.
<excerpt>Their new villages will have new roads, schools, medical,
sanitation and drinking water facilities and households will have
electrical connections.
</excerpt>
No new villages have been built with the amenities claimed by Ogden.
<excerpt> In addition to those improvements to their quality of life,
many residents are being located from areas that flood during monsoon
season.
</excerpt>
It is precisely because these lands flood that they are so fertile. The
normal annual floods are a huge benefit to farmers and ecosystems along
the Narmada. The unpredictable and rapid floods caused by poor dam
operation along the Narmada (and many other rivers), have however
caused great damage in recent years.
<excerpt>Finally, beyond the usual benefits of supplying electricity to
any region,
India's rivers are important sources of irrigation for farming. The
power
provided by dams such as the proposed Maheshwar will help make
irrigation
possible in the Narmada Valley, an area with great agricultural
potential.
</excerpt>
Not only is irrigation already carried out on a large scale in the
plains along the Narmada, but much of the land to be flooded by
Maheshwar is already irrigated. These lands are some of the most
fertile in India.
<excerpt>
Our goal is to generate electricity in safe, environmentally acceptable
ways and we carefully consider all aspects of our projects. This
project
meets all objective environmental and safety criteria and offers
significant benefits to the people of the region. In fact, these same
people are voicing their support in increasing numbers and are
encouraging
us to move toward completion as rapidly as possible. We look forward to
serving them, just as we meet the needs of people in many countries
around
the world.
</excerpt>
Which "objective criteria" does Maheshwar meet? How can it reach any
criteria in the absence of an EIA? How does Burton reconcile the
supposed local support for the project with the fact that local people
have occupied the dam site on nine separate occasions and that nearly
300 elected
representatives of the affected area have sent Ogden a resolution
opposing the project.
--------------------
Some people have been asking Ogden if they know why the other companies
pulled out of Maheshwar. Below is some info on this.
In early 1996, <bold>PacifiCorp</bold> decided not to pursue its energy
investments in India, including its efforts in the Maheshwar project
(through its subsidiary PacGen), presumably because of concerns over
their potential profitability (or lack of it). However PacGen seem to
have still been interested in the project and maintained contact with
S. Kumars, apparently believing that the project's financial problems
could be sorted out. However once the campaign heated up locally and
NBA and IRN started to hassle them, they appear to have ended their
interest in the project. (PacGen got involved in early 1995 when they
took over San Francisco-based <bold>Bechtel</bold>'s interest in the
project).
Following is an extract from a letter from Dennis J. Quinn, VP of
PacifiCorp, to the NBA on May 7, 1998.
"We have much respect for the S. Kumars organization, but we also
respect
the concerns of the people expressed in your letter to us. You can be
assured that PacifiCorp will continue to respect your concerns and
will
take no active role in the project. S. Kumars has been kind enough to
keep
the opportunity open to us to participate actively again in the
Project.
If PacifiCorp were to reevaluate an investment position in the Project
in
the future, it would only be under the condition that the needs of the
mass
of affected people be properly addressed and consensus regarding how
the
Project proceeds is reached by all stakeholders, including Narmada
Bachao
Andolan."
In looking back over this stuff I was reminded of yet another Maheshwar
reject - the major Dutch bank <bold>ABN Amro</bold> who were attempting
to put together a financing package for S Kumars when PacGen were
involved. According to a phone call I had with Quinn, ABN Amro quit in
1995/96 as it was unsuccesful in locating int'l finance.
In April 1999 the press officer for German utility <bold>VEW
</bold>told Heffa that they quit because: 1) They realized they weren't
going to get an investment guarantee from the German Govt. 2) They
didn't want to be associated any longer with a project with such
massive social implications 3) Due to the coming liberalization of the
German energy market, they needed to focus on securing their domestic
market.
Joern-Erik Mantz, <bold>Bayernwek</bold> Project Officer for Maheshwar,
told Heffa in April 1999:
<excerpt>"Our contracts with the SMHPC have run out. We would only be
willing to consider involvement in the project anew if the authorities
are able to provide land-for-land resettlement, with land of sufficient
quality as per the conditions of the Madhya Pradesh State
rehabilitation policy for the Narmada Projects".
</excerpt>
References: