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dam-l LS: Outlook article on failed irrigation projects



Source: Outlook, May 15, 2000 (www.outlookindia.com)

Damned Temples

Big dams have guzzled huge amounts of money but have failed their 
objective miserably

                    It’s clearly a case of fallen idols. Pandit Jawaharlal
                    Nehru’s "temples of modern India" have failed to deliver
                    and the old faithfuls now have to contend with a new,
                    young band of sceptics. As the debate over large dams
                    versus traditional methods of water harvesting continues,
                    the rosy picture painted by the architects of these
                    temples is gradually losing its colour. A cursory look at
                    the report card of some of India’s major and medium
                    irrigation projects reveals that despite their
                    ever-burgeoning project cost, they have miserably failed
                    to achieve their projected potential. Data obtained by
                    Outlook from the ministry of water resources show that in
                    certain cases, some of these dams and canals don’t
                    irrigate even an inch of land.

                    The reasons for this may vary from lack of infrastructure
                    and funds to people’s resistance. But the end result is
                    clearly disappointing. Sources in the ministry of water
                    resources say that in some cases the project is ready
                    but is not being used to its full capacity due to 
the lack of
                    an efficient canal network. With each passing year the
                    cumulative cost of the project spirals up, running into
                    hundreds of crore of rupees without any apparent benefit.

                     In this light, the argument of the inevitability of
big dams like the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) or the Tehri dam comes 
under sharp
scrutiny. The anti-dam lobby argues that when the created potential 
(what is meant
to be achieved) of already existing projects is becoming hard to achieve, what
is the guarantee that the hopes being raised by the proponents of big dams will
not prove to be a farce. Says Himanshu Thakkar of the South Asia Network on
Dam, Rivers and People:  "They have created the projects but they have not
been able to utilise their full potential."

                    The pro-SSP lobby, or for that matter even the
Gujarat government, has been maintaining that big dams have become 
inevitable. The
fact that what the existing projects actually achieve is far less than the
projected potential (see infographic on page 29) provides a solid 
ground to the anti-big
dam lobby which says mega  projects eventually turn out to be white elephants.

                    Nirmal Sengupta of the Madras Institute for
Development Studies has conducted a comprehensive study of the 
potential utilisation of
major irrigation projects. In his study, prepared for the World 
Commission on Dams
(WCD), Sengupta observed:  "As per the irrigation department data, 
13.7 per cent
of created potential in major and medium irrigation projects in India is
unutilised. According to the land use statistics collected by the 
revenue department,
underutilisation is about 25 per cent."

                    Sengupta claims that if the full potential of the
existing major/ medium projects is used, at least 40,52,000 hectares 
of land may be
brought under irrigation. Another 40,29,000 hectares can be irrigated 
by using the full
potential of minor projects.

                    But some figures present a depressing scenario. Work
on the Jamrani dam in Nainital district of Uttar Pradesh began in 1975 with
an estimated cost of Rs 61.25 crore. The project was supposed to 
irrigate 66,000
hectares of land. But 25 years later-and with the upgraded cost 
estimate of Rs 280
crore-the achieved potential is only 21,000 hectares. The Gosikhurd project in
Maharashtra began two decades ago with an estimated cost of Rs 461.11 
crore. It had
the projected irrigation potential of 2,50,800 hectares. In the eighth plan
the cumulative cost of the project has increased by five times. 
Achieved potential:
zilch.

                    Similarly in Madhya Pradesh, the Rajghat II project
began in 1975 with the project irrigation capacity of 1,16,600 
hectares. Twenty-five
years later the cost went up from Rs 309.21 crore to Rs 523.41 crore. But the
achieved potential remained only 9,000 hectares. Subarnarekha in 
Bihar (Rs 1,428
crore) had the projected potential of 236.85 hectares when it was conceived
around 1975. In the last 25 years the cost of the project and its 
upgradation has
gone up to Rs 2,376 crore but it has also failed to achieve the projected
target.

                    Even more striking is the attitude of the state
governments who have an interest in not declaring a project complete. 
Once a project is
over, the Planning Commission stops funding it. Therefore, in some
instances the state governments declare their projects as ongoing so 
that the inflow
of funds from the Centre, needed for the maintenance of the completed project,
doesn’t stop. The most telling example probably is the Nagarjuna Sagar dam
in Andhra Pradesh. This project began in the late 1950s and was estimated to
cost Rs 91.12 crore. Four decades down the line it’s still on even though it
has more or less achieved its ultimate potential of irrigating 895.28 thousand
hectares of land. The latest add-up cost has run into Rs 1,000 crore.

                    Thakkar says that the solution doesn’t lie in large
dams. According to him, the poor maintenance of the dams also affects their
potential adversely. It is a known fact that some of the dams have 
collected huge
amounts of silt resulting in less quantity of stored water. According 
to reports, a
38-foot high dam in Gujarat has 28 feet of silt. That means a dam which has the
capacity of storing 38 feet of water holds only 10 feet water. The project
irrigation capacity will naturally go down.

                    The question that begs an answer, therefore, is: what
is the rationale of going in for mega projects for the development of 
agriculture
when the already existing projects are lagging far behind in achieving their
projected objective? As the country reels under one of its worst droughts, the
question becomes even more  important. Rosy pictures don’t really make reality
any less harsh.

                    By Rajesh Joshi