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DAM-L Newsletter on Dams/LS (fwd)
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=================================
W R M B U L L E T I N 42
JANUARY 2001
=================================
THE FOCUS OF THIS ISSUE: hydroelectric dams
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WORLD RAINFOREST MOVEMENT
MOVIMIENTO MUNDIAL POR LOS BOSQUES
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=================================
W R M B U L L E T I N 42
JANUARY 2001
=================================
THE FOCUS OF THIS ISSUE: hydroelectric dams
For many years, local peoples and environmentalists have been opposing
large dams due to the severe social and environmental impacts they entail.
Since its creation, the WRM has been an active participant in the fight
against dams, and included them as a major cause of forest loss already in
its 1989 "Penang Declaration." During the past years, we have been trying
to assist local peoples' struggles against dams and reflecting them in
almost every issue of our bulletin (all available at
http://www.wrm.org.uy/deforestation/dams.html ). We have now decided to
dedicate an entire bulletin to this problem, with the aim of sharing
information to enhance opposition to this destructive activity at a moment
when, on the one hand, the World Commission on Dams has produced an
extensive report detailing the damaging effect of large dams, and, on the
other hand, when organizations worldwide are preparing an "International
Day of Action against Dams and for Rivers, Water and Life", to take place
on March 14. We hope the bulletin will contribute to increase awareness
and solidarity with the struggle.
In this issue:
* OUR VIEWPOINT
- Dams, forests and people
* LOCAL STRUGGLES AND NEWS
AFRICA
- Kenya: Resistance to the Sondu Mirium Dam project
- Namibia: Uncertainty on the future of Epupa Dam
- The Bujagali Dam: A useless giant in Uganda
ASIA
- Malaysia: Bakun Dam project once again relaunched
- Philippines: Local people against the San Roque dam
- Turkey: The Ilisu Dam and export credit agencies
- Dam in Vietnam hits Cambodians
CENTRAL AMERICA
- Guatemala: A dam and the massacre of 400 people
SOUTH AMERICA
- Brazil: Interamerican Development Bank promotes destruction of Upper
Tocantins River
- Chile: The struggle of the Pehuenche against the Ralco Dam
- Colombia: The Urra Dam and the death of the Sinu River
* GENERAL
- The World Commission on Dams' report
- Hydroelectric dams are no solution to climate change
- International Day of Action against dams
***********************************************************
* OUR VIEWPOINT
************************************************************
- Dams, forests and people
When asked to name different causes of deforestation, few people will
mention hydroelectric dams as being one of them. Even fewer will include
them as a cause of human rights violations. However, dams constitute a
major direct and indirect cause of forest loss and most of them have
resulted in widespread human rights abuses.
This lack of awareness can be explained by the fact that for many years
large hydroelectric dams have been portrayed as synonymous with
development. Another reason can be that most users of hydro-electricity
live far away from the impacted areas and that the sites selected for dam
building have been often those inhabited by indigenous peoples, ethnic
minorities and poor communities having little capacity of being heard by
the wider national community.
The fact is that more than 45,000 large dams --those that measure more
than 15 metres in height-- are currently obstructing the world's rivers,
whose reservoirs cover more than 400,000 square kilometres of land --an
area larger than the combined surfaces of the United Kingdom, Belgium, The
Netherlands and Austria.
These reservoirs have inundated millions of hectares of forests
-particularly in the tropics-- many of which were not even logged and
trees were left to slowly rot. They have also resulted in deforestation
elsewhere, as farmers displaced by the dams have had to clear forests in
other areas in order to grow their crops and build their homes.
Additionally, dams imply road building, thus allowing access to previously
remote areas by loggers and "developers", resulting in further
deforestation processes.
However, the dams' effects have included much more than forest loss and
the major environmental changes have impacted on local people, at both the
dam site and in the entire river basin. Not only are the best agricultural
soils flooded by the reservoir, but major changes occur in the
environment, where the river's flora and fauna begins to disappear, with
strong impacts on people dependent on those resources. At the same time,
dams imply a number of health hazards, starting with diseases introduced
by the thousands of workers that are brought in to build the dam
(including AIDS, syphilis, tuberculosis, measles and others) and ending
with diseases related to the reservoir itself (malaria, schistosomiasis,
river blindness, etc.).
In far too many cases, dam-building has resulted in widespread human
rights violations. As most of us would, local peoples have persistently
resisted the destruction of their homelands and their forced
"resettlement." As a result, they have had to face different types of
repression, ranging from physical and legal threats to mass murders, such
as in the case of the Chixoy dam in Guatemala (see article in this
bulletin).
But resistance, consciousness and solidarity have grown. Local people have
increasingly been able to organize themselves and to establish local,
national and international alliances with other concerned organizations.
Major examples are the Narmada Bachao Andolan movement in India, the Bio
Bio Action Group in Chile, the Coalition of Concerned NGOs on Bakun in
Malaysia, the People Affected by Dams movement in Brazil among many
others. It has now become possible to stop large hydro dams. They are
definitely not a symbol of development but one of economic and political
power resulting in social and environmental degradation.
************************************************************
* LOCAL STRUGGLES AND NEWS
************************************************************
AFRICA
- Kenya: Resistance to the Sondu Mirium Dam project
The Sondu Miriu River is one of the six major rivers in the Lake Victoria
basin, which drains 3,470 square kilometres in the western part of Kenya.
The company responsible for managing all public power generation
facilities in Kenya --KenGen-- is planning a dam project to be located
about 400 kilometres from Nairobi. Water from the river will be diverted
through a 7.2 kilometre long tunnel into a one million cubic meter
reservoir and a 60 megawatt hydro power station.
This megaproject is being financed by the Japan Bank for International
Cooperation together with KenGen. Kenya is the largest recipient in Africa
of Japanese official "aid": in 1999 Japan devoted more than U$S 57 million
under the form of grants and loans to this aim. The civil works are being
carried out by Konoike Construction JV, Viedekke Heavy Construction
Company of Norway and Murray & Roberts Contractors International of South
Africa.
Even though the power station is scheduled to be operational in 2003, some
of the works --like the construction of camp sites, roads, a bridge, and
communication facilities-- have already started, and together with them
the fears over the environmental and social impacts of the project.
According to the NGO coalition Africa Water Network, the diversion of the
river will cause the disruption of the whole hydrological basin, with
negative consequences on wildlife. Colobus monkeys and hippopotamus, for
example, which are dependent on the river will be forced to seek a source
of water at the lower populous Nyakwere plains disturbing their habitat.
KenGen is not taking responsibility on the issue, arguing that this is the
competence of governmental agencies. The company even claims that a part
of the river's flow will keep on running on the original channel.
Nevertheless, similar river diversion projects for the Turkwel Gorge and
Masinga hydropower dams resulted in the permanent or seasonal drying up of
the courses. The blasting needed to build the tunnel will alter the
geomorphology of the area, and the entire water table may be also affected
by the construction.
Social impacts are already taking place. Since health precaution measures
have not been put in place to handle the effects of the great dust clouds
that come off the construction project, most members of the community are
already suffering from eye and respiratory problems. The diversion of the
river will provoke a shortage in the supply of water, which is a vital
element for domestic and agricultural use by 1,500 local households.
Additionally local communities have denounced that KenGen has not kept its
promise of providing them electricity and irrigation facilities, as stated
in the initial project documents. Now the company says that such
activities are beyond its mandate. Last but not least the project has so
far displaced 1,000 households through forced resettlement. In March 2000
KenGen admitted lacking plans to relocate people who will be affected by
power transmission lines from the dam.
Resistance to the project is on the rise and so is repression by Kenyan
authorities. Last December Argwings Odera --an activist of the Africa
Water Network who works with dam affected people-- was arrested, beaten
and shot in an arm by the police. He is now facing criminal charges for
holding meetings and trying to share information and raise awareness about
the project.
Article based on information from: "Kenyan Dam Protester Arrested, Shot"
http://ens-news.com/ens/jan2001/2001L-01-11-01.html
************************************************************
- Namibia: Uncertainty on the future of Epupa Dam
For over five years plans have been discussed by the Namibian and Angolan
governments to dam the Kunene river, which runs through both countries,
and construct a hydroelectric power station somewhere south of the Angolan
border. The proposals have been dogged by controversy and delays from the
outset and have developed into a saga, which has rumbled on and on without
ever seeming to reach closer to a conclusion.
The controversy has centred on the impact of the dam on the indigenous
tribal group of the Kunene region, the Ovahimba, who have successfully
lived as nomad pastoralists in the area for the past five-hundred years.
Of the two potential sites for the dam the most economically viable, at
Epupa, is the least environmentally and socially attractive; a dam wall
163 metres high would create a reservoir covering up to 380 square
kilometres. This would displace 1,100 Himba and affect 5,000 occasional
users of the excellent grazing areas on the river bank. In addition, 95
archaeological sites and 160 Himba graves sites would be permanently lost.
The Namibian government has often come under criticism for excluding the
interests of its many minorities, including the San Bushmen and Rehoboth
Basters, and it can be of little surprise that it has always favoured the
Epupa option, yet has made minimal efforts to consult the local population
about the consequences for them of such a project and how they might be
mitigated. In fact, a feasibility study commissioned by the respective
governments carried out in 1999 concluded that "there has not been
sufficient dissemination of information concerning the scheme, or local
community consultation, participation and ... development of an acceptable
social mitigation programme." Fears that the disruption to the Himba and
their grazing areas could lead to their urban migration and the demise of
their way of life brought the response from the Namibian authorities that
the project would bring much-needed jobs to the Kunene region --so in tune
with the feelings of the local population was the government that it
forgot that the Himba are nomadic farmers who neither need nor want jobs.
The second possible site, at Baynes, some 40 km south of Epupa, would
cover just 57 square kilometres of land, drowning 15 grave and 45
archaeological sites, displacing one-hundred permanent users and about
2,000 occasional ones. However, this site is far and away the least
economically viable and could only work with the benefit of the
war-damaged Gove dam inside Angola. The Angolan government, which would
like an excuse and funding to rejunenate Gove, favours this option.
However, there are good reasons to question both sites. Apart from the
seRious disruption to the Himba population, creating a reservoir which
would evaporate twice as much water as the country uses in a year seems to
make little sense, especially in the desert and semi-desert landscapes of
Namibia. In addition, in times of drought the power station could expect
to see its output fall dramatically from 360 megawatts to 200 megawatts.
The Himba themselves have suggested looking into solar and wind energy as
alternatives, but have received short shrift from a government with an
antipathy to any form of opposition and who is also "obsessed with
building the dam, despite the fact that both the EU and the World bank
have expressed strong reservations about its viability." (Stephen Corry,
Director of Survival International, a group that campaigns for the rights
of minority tribes).
Finally, will it ever happen? Sources close to the Namibian government
have suggested that the plan has been shelved, partly due to adverse
publicity and a resultant lack of investor interest. Certainly little
progress has been made in the past few years and no decision has been made
on which site, if either, would get the nod. Only last year in a July
visit to Namibia, Luis da Silva, the Angolan energy and water affairs
minister, declared that his government's pRiority was to rehabilitate Gove
dam, suggesting that bilateral agreement is as far off as ever. Given that
the Gove/Baynes option is contingent on the Angolan government securing
the Gove area from UNITA rebels, if the two governments do agree on this
plan it could not go ahead for the foreseeable future. However, this is
largely immaterial as Namibia would agree to Epupa or nothing, which makes
it difficult to believe that the plan will now go ahead at all.
By: Henry Dummett, e-mail: HenryDummett@eiu.com
************************************************************
- The Bujagali Dam: A useless giant in Uganda
The Ugandan government --backed by the International Finance Corporation,
the World Bank, the US agency Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), and a number of European export credit agencies (ECAs)-- is
promoting the construction of a huge dam which, if implemented, will
destroy the living space of thousands of local dwellers together with the
scenic beauty and historical sites at the Bujagali falls region on the
Upper Nile River. Responsible for the construction of this U$S 530 million
hydroelectric dam is US-based AES corporation.
The main argument of the promoters of the project is that it will be
useful to alleviate poverty and reduce the use of fuelwood and charcoal in
a country with one of the lowest per capita income in the world, and where
about 95% of the population does not have access to electricity. This
argument clearly confuses causes and consequences. As Martin Musumba of
"Save Bujagali" Campaign says, "the real issue in Uganda is not
electricity but poverty. Currently the majority of Ugandans have no money
for electricity, for they are below the poverty line. Production of more
electricity will not reduce use of fuelwood and charcoal until deliberate
programs are evolved to reduce poverty and the cost of power."
The megaproject would completely alter the landscape, since it would flood
the Nile all the way to the base of the Owens Falls Dam. As well as in the
case of the Owens Falls Dam, located just 10 miles below the projected
site of the Bujagali Dam, no independent environmental impact assessment
(EIA) has been performed. According to Dr John Baliwa of the Fisheries
Research Programme, the sources of the Nile, an extensive fishery resource
with an estimated potential of 10,000 metric tons of fish per year, are
menaced by the accumulation of water hyacinth behind the several dams
existing in the region. Cumulative impacts including the desiccation of
wetlands and the destruction of forests along the river are also feared.
>From the socioeconomic point of view, consequences are equally negative.
An EIA performed by AES itself considers that the dam would permanently
displace 820 people, and affect an additional 6,000 by submerging communal
lands and sacred burial sites. Replacement land for those who would lose
homes or crops is not planned. In addition, the reservoir is expected to
increase seRious water-borne diseases like schistosomiasis and malaria,
being the latter already the most important cause of death in Uganda.
Sustainable tourism activities especially by foreign visitors who like to
enjoy rafting in the spectacular series of cascading rapids of the
Bujagali Falls will disappear, which will mean a significative decrease in
the incomes of local communities. Jobs for local people promised by the
company during the works have never turned into reality.
Ugandan and international concerned organizations are putting forward
alternatives to this useless giant. They are promoting the use of true
renewables like solar and wind, which constitute realistic and viable
possibilities in order to stop the pressure on native forests for fuelwood
and charcoal. "Future economic prosperity and sustainable water resource
management in Uganda will not lie in huge dams. The way forward is the
wise use of river-based environmental goods and services; not their
extinction through the pursuit of hydropower lunacy," says the
Kampala-based National Association of Professional Environmentalists,
which carried out a study of the area in February 2000.
Article based on information from: http://www.uganda.co.ug/bujagali/; US
Company Plans to Dam Uganda's Bujagali Falls" by Lori Pottinger,
International Rivers Network, e-mail: lori@irn.org
************************************************************
ASIA
- Malaysia: Bakun Dam project once again relaunched
The Bakum Dam project --the largest in Southeast Asia-- was originally
planned by the Malaysian authorities in the early 1980s, abandoned in
1990, revived in 1993 and reshaped in 1997. The Bakun Hydroelectric
Corporation is the owner and future operator of the dam. Lahmeyer
International from Germany, Harza from the US and Dohg-Ah Construction and
Industrial Co. from South Korea have been involved in the supervising of
the works and the construction of the tunnel for the diversion of the
waters. The main construction package of this multimillion dollar
initiative was first granted to the Swiss-Swedish multinational ABB and
the Companhia Brasileira de Projectos e Obras (CBPO), but in late 1997
problems arose and ABB was sacked from the project. The expected and real
impacts of the projected dam on the environment and local communities, and
the controversy that such megaproject has brought with it, are in line
with its gigantic scale.
According to the original plan of the dam, about 69,000 hectares of
primary rainforest --which represents one third of Sarawak's remaining
pristine forests-- were to be logged. Clearcutting could have catastrophic
effects on the dam itself, increasing the chance of sediment build up,
flood and slope failure. Fish stocks would be dramatically reduced
following the loss of mobility and deoxygenation of river water in the
flooded area, while 43 protected species of fauna and 67 protected species
of flora could disappear because of flooding. The project's environmental
impact assessment was never released to the public, although this is a
legal requirement.
Local villagers, indigenous peoples, and human rights and environmental
groups in Malaysia and abroad have repeatedly denounced the lack of
transparency surrounding the project from the very beginning. The
infrastructure needed for the works has facilitated the encroachment on
Native Customary Rights lands. The forced resettlement of the Bakun
residents --which sum about 10,000 indigenous people belonging to 15
longhouses-- is a major impact caused by the project. Indigenous
communities of the Kayan, Kenyah, Lahanan, Ukit and Penan ethnic groups
have definitely lost their lands and crops --including traditional rice
varieties-- and were resettled in a location called Asap. The government
promised to compensate them, as though the loss of their homeland and
culture could be somehow repaired. But in fact they were only provided
with modest houses in a new "modern" village lacking completely adequate
infrastructure regarding roads, waste disposal and schools and where no
job opportunities exist.
Because of the Asian economic crisis in 1997 the Malaysian government had
to halt the project, as well as several other major infrastructure
initiatives, in order to reduce public spending. However, Bakun's long
and tortuous story is not over yet, since two years later the authorities
raised the proposal of restarting the project, presenting a downsized plan
according to which the original generation power of the dam of 2,300
megawatts was reduced to 500 megawatts. The Coalition of Concerned NGOs on
Bakun (Gabungan), the Bakun Region People's Committee (BRPC), Sahabat Alam
Malaysia (Friends of the Earth) and other representatives of Malaysian
civil society and academic circles consider nonetheless that the only real
solution to the conflict is to definitely shelve the project. They
advocate for a more realistic, sustainable, transparent and democratic
approach to the issue of energy needs and supply in Malaysia.
Article based on information from: "Malaysian megadam won't go away", BBC
News, 16/11/2000,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/asia-pacific/news ;
http://irn.org/programs/bakun/ ; Lang, Chris et al., "Dams incorporated.
The record of Twelve European Dam building Companies", A Report by the
Corner House published by the Swedish Society for Nature Conservation,
February 2000; WRM Bulletins 2, 9, 24 and 29.
************************************************************
- Philippines: Local people against the San Roque dam
The San Roque Dam is to be located on the lower Agno River of Pangasinan
Province, in the Cordillera region of Luzon island in the Philippines. If
built, San Roque would be the tallest dam --at 200 meters-- and largest
private hydropower project in Asia, generating 345 megawatts of power.
Electricity generated by the dam would be primarily used to power
industrial activity and the burgeoning mining industry in northern Luzon.
Preparation of the site began in 1998, and construction is slated for
completion in 2004. San Roque is the third dam to be constructed on the
Agno river: the first two, Binga and Ambuklao, were built in the 1950s.
The San Roque Power Corporation (SRPC) is owned by a Japanese trading
company, Marubeni (41%); a subsidiary of US energy company Sithe Energies
Inc. (51%), which is 29% owned by Marubeni; and a Japanese utility
company, Kansai Electric (7.5%). In 1997, the Philippines National Power
Corporation (NPC) gave the SRPC the rights to build, operate and maintain
the project for a peRiod of 25 years. In return, the NPC has agreed to buy
power for a price of P2.98 per kilowatt-hour. In April 1998, US-based
Raytheon company won a $700 million sub-contract to design and build the
facility.
The project cost is estimated at US $1.19 billion. In October 1998, JEXIM
(the Export-Import Bank of Japan) approved a $302 million loan to the
private sector developers, and is considering an additional $400 million
loan to finance the Philippines National Power Corporation's contribution
to the project. Other financing is expected to come from a consortium of
Japanese commercial banks and equity provided by the project sponsors.
Project benefits are said to include irrigation of 87,000 hectares, water
quality improvements due to reduced downstream siltation, and 50 percent
reduction of floods which destroy crops during the rainy season. However,
the two upstream dams, Binga and Ambuklao, have been plagued by excessive
sedimentation due to logging and gold mining operations in the Agno
watershed, resulting in more severe floods at the upper end of the
reservoirs. There is no reason to believe that the situation will be any
different at San Roque.
Over 160 families at the dam site in Pangasinan were forcibly displaced in
early 1998 and for almost a year were living in desperate conditions at a
temporary site. They were promised land, houses, alternative livelihood
sources and social services, but instead the NPC distributed P10,000 per
family as supposed compensation. Only in late January 1999 were 147 houses
in the new resettlement site handed over to the displaced families.
Another 402 families in Pangasinan will be required to relocate before the
project is completed.
The project is fiercely opposed by thousands of indigenous Ibaloi peoples
upstream of the dam site. NGOs in the region estimate that if the dam is
built, more than 2,000 Ibaloi families in Itogon, Benguet will be
adversely affected by the project. Many of the people facing resettlement
were forced to move once before to make way for the Binga and Ambuklao
dams upstream. The livelihoods of tens of thousands of downstream
residents will be affected due to erosion and destruction of fisheries.
It is important to underscore that JEXIM's environmental guidelines state
that people resettled by projects it funds must have given their consent.
Given the strident opposition of the populations slated for resettlement,
it appears that JEXIM's support for this project violates its own
guidelines. Affected peoples have written to JEXIM in protest, to no
avail.
Approximately 4,000 residents, municipal and barangay officials including
the mayor of San Nicholas, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan - Central Luzon
(BAYAN-CL) and the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) trooped to the
municipal plaza and held a rally calling for the stoppage of the San Roque
Dam project last September 30th, 2000 in San Nicholas, Pangasinan.
The rally highlighted the failure of the Marubeni Company to meet the
peoples' demands and conditionalities attached to the dam construction.
Local organizations have been campaigning for the total stoppage of the
dam project because of its adverse social and environmental effects on the
host community. Furthermore, they believe that the project will not
benefit the Filipino people. Besides being a burden to the Filipino
taxpayers, the $1.2 billion dam will only serve the energy needs of the
foreign mining companies who are out to exploit their natural resources.
The project also violates the indigenous peoples and farmers rights over
their lands.
Article based on information from: San Roque Hydropower and Irrigation
Project, International Rivers Network, March 1999; Cordillera Peoples
Alliance, Press Release 11/02/00
************************************************************
- Turkey: The Ilisu Dam and export credit agencies
Over the past 30 years, activists have fought a long battle for
institutions such as the World Bank to adopt social and environmental
policies. However, these institutions are no longer the main source of
public finance for 'development' projects in the South. Export Credit
Agencies (ECAs) are now the largest public funders of large-scale
infrastructure projects in southern countries, exceeding by far the
infrastructure investments of multilateral development banks and bilateral
aid agencies. Yet the majority of ECAs --with rare exceptions such as the
US Export-Import Bank and the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation--
have no human rights, environmental and development standards. This allows
them to support the type of projects that even multilateral developments
banks find problematic, including logging, mining, nuclear plants and oil
drilling, as well as dams.
The controversial Ilisu dam project, currently planned for the Tigris
River in the Kurdish region of Turkey, is a case in point. The ECAs of
nine countries are considering support for this dam which would enable
their corporations to do business with a torturing state. The dam's
construction consortium is seeking export credits and investment insurance
guarantees from the ECAs of Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.
Since 1984, an armed conflict between the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
and the Turkish State has devastated the region where the Ilisu dam is to
be built. Around three million people have been displaced, 3,000 villages
partially or totally destroyed, and over 30,000 people killed. Despite
1999's PKK decision to pursue a peaceful political solution to the as yet
unresolved Kurdish question, many parts of the region remain a war zone to
this day. Human rights abuses ranging from extra-judicial killings to
torture, rape and disappearances are still common.
According to the latest estimates, the dam will affect up to 78,000
people, the majority of them Kurdish. Many local people see the project as
part of a wider strategy of ethnically cleansing the area of Kurds. The
resettlement plan and environmental impact assessment for the dam have yet
to be published and there has been minimal consultation with those who
will be moved. Conditions in the region make it extremely unlikely that
resettlement could be carried out according to international standards.
"We don't want this dam ... This is where I belong," one of the Kurdish
people to be affected by the dam told a human rights delegation which
visited the Ilisu area.
The dam will also inundate the 10,000-year-old town of Hasankeyf, home to
historical treasures including cave churches, ornate mosques and Islamic
tombs. Over the course of millennia, layers of civilisation have been
interwoven over each other in the valley bed and surrounding caves.
Destroying the Kurdish people's most important cultural sites, such as
Hasankeyf, is seen by local people as a yet another tactic to deny the
Kurds their ethnic identity.
Apart from the dam's devastating local impacts --on the environment, the
people and their culture-- another ugly consequence rears its head: water
wars. The Ilisu dam is to straddle the Tigris River 65 kilometres upstream
of the border with Iraq and Syria and threatens to disrupt much-needed
water supplies to those countries.
Plans to build the Ilisu Dam were first mooted in 1954. Although
pre-feasibility studies were completed in 1971 and the final design for
the dam was approved in 1982, the project remained on the drawing board
until the late 1990s. One reason for the delay lay in a lack of finance.
The armed conflict left the Turkish government unable to fund the project
alone and led to the World Bank signalling that it would be unwilling to
finance infrastructure in the region.
In 1996, the Turkish government offered Ilisu to the private sector as a
Build-Operate-Transfer project, but no bidder could be found. A year
later, Turkey's State Hydraulic Works (DSI) selected Swiss company Sulzer
Hydro as the main contractor for the project, which retained
responsibility for the electromechanical works, with ABB of Switzerland.
Civil engineering works were subcontracted to a consortium led by UK
construction company Balfour Beatty. Other companies in the consortium
included Impregilo of Italy, Skanska of Sweden and three Turkish
construction companies, Nurol, Kiska and Tekfen. The engineering
consultants to the project are Binnie and Partners (now Binnie, Black and
Veatch). As yet, no contracts have been signed between the DSI and any of
the companies in the consortium. ABB's involvement in the dam ceased in
March 2000, when it sold out its hydropower business to Alstom of France.
In September 2000, the Ilisu consortium lost another of its original
members, when Skanska announced its withdrawal from the project.
The financial package for Ilisu will be arranged by the Union Bank of
Switzerland (UBS). With approximately half of the construction costs being
made up of imports from Western Europe and the USA, the companies in the
consortium sought export credit guarantees to back their contracts.
In November 1998, the Swiss export credit agency, Exportrisikogarantie
(ERG), approved provisional export credit support of 470 million Swiss
francs for the Ilisu contracts of Sulzer Hydro and ABB. Conditional
approval has also been granted by the UK's Export Credit Guarantee
Department (ECGD) for a $200 million credit for Balfour Beatty, whose US
subsidiary has also obtained provisional consent to a further credit from
the US Exim Bank. Italy's export credit agency SACE has similarly given
approval for a $152 million guarantee to Impregilo, although this has
still to be confirmed by the Interministerial Committee on Economic
Planning.
While Ilisu is an important issue on many grounds in its own right, it is
also a rallying point for international campaigners, who see Ilisu as a
test case for ECA reform. This is a critical year for the Ilisu dam
project. The ECAs' decision is expected within the next few months.
Without export credit support, it is unlikely that the dam could be built.
By Kate Geary, Ilisu Dam Campaign, (UK), email: ilisu@gn.apc.org; web
site: htttp://www.ilisu.org.uk
************************************************************
- Dam in Vietnam hits Cambodians
Vietnam's US $1 billion Yali Falls 720-megawatt hydroelectric dam, under
construction for the past seven years -- with funding from the governments
of Russia and Ukraine-- drains into the Se San river which runs through
Cambodia to the Mekong. Before the dam-building began, no study was done
of its environmental effect on Cambodia. A study recently carried out by
the Fisheries Office, Ratanakiri Province, in cooperation with the
Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFP) Project, an NGO working in Ratanakiri
Province, shows that the dam is bringing death, disease and environmental
devastation to Cambodia even before it is fully working.
Earlier last year the first reports began to emerge from Ratanakkiri that
problems had developed with the Se San river, and that the source of these
problems was upstream at Vietnam's new Yali Falls dam.
Cambodians along the Se San river told of sudden surges of water drowning
32 people, mostly children. In the single worst case three teenage girls
were drowned trying to cross the river. Villagers spoke of their fishing
boats and nets being swept away, livestock being drowned and crops
inundated.
In addition, locals reported 952 deaths from disease since they perceived
a change in water quality over the past four years. Stock losses have been
reported in the thousands as well as significant numbers of wild animals
dying after drinking water from the river.
According to the study carried out by the Fisheries Office and the NTFP
Project, the water quality has deteRiorated greatly since 1996. Surges of
water coming downstream are reddish in color, muddy and have the foul
odour of stagnant water.
The report could not quantify the health effects of the water quality, but
noted that people living along the river reported a rapid decline in
health once the changes became apparent. Locals complain of intense
itchiness, lumps and infections on their skin, and eye irritation. They
have also reported other health problems that have coincided with the
sudden rises in water levels. These included stomach aches, diarrhea,
respiratory problems, throat and nose irritation, dizziness, vomiting and
coughing. Many reported family members dying one to five days after
becoming ill.
Ratanakkiri province has some of the richest areas of wildlife in
Cambodia, but these animals too have been seRiously affected by the
hydrological changes in the Se San as well as suffering from the effects
of the water quality changes.
In Virachey National Park, on the northern side of the Se San river in Ta
Veng and Ven Say districts, reptiles, mammals and birds have died or
become ill at a greater than usual rate. People from many communities
along the Se San have reported finding dead wildlife near their villages
over the past few years. Many villagers believe that the wild animals had
gone down to the Se San river to drink and then died shortly afterwards.
The changing water quality is also believed to have harmed fish stocks and
habitat. The number of fish has declined noticeably, with some villagers
putting fish stocks down by as much as 30 percent.
Meanwhile four years of irregular flooding have caused major food
shortages to people in the area. Dry season crops which are planted along
the banks of the Se San have been swept away by the surges of water
following discharges from the dam. Locals now rely on wild potatoes and
other tubers to sustain them. In addition, about 14 types of river plants
that villagers used to collect to eat have been in serious decline over
the past few years.
A two-day workshop attended by representatives of ethnic minority groups
living on the Tonle Se San, local and international NGOs, and provincial
officials, was held at the end of May 2000 to discuss the effect of the
dam. The call for changing the river back was far more dominant than any
request for cash compensation.
"If they want to give us compensation will they be able to feed us all our
lives? It seems impossible, and what about our children and grandchildren?
How are they going to survive? We want the old Se San back so we can fish
and do other activities the same as before", said Lamas Voen from Phi
village.
Article based on information from: "Huge Viet dam devastates Se San valley
and its people", by Bou Saroeun, Phnom Penh Post, June 9-22 2000; Kate
Colvin and Dave Hubbel,"People of Se San River Suffer Dam-Induced Floods,
Famine"; To see the study prepared by the Ratanakiri Provincial Fisheries
Office and the NTFP Project, go to:
http://www.cambodiacorps.org/VN_Dam-ImpactStudy-1.html
************************************************************
CENTRAL AMERICA
- Guatemala: A dam and the massacre of 400 people
Forced resettlement of local people living in the area where dams are
built usually results in human rights abuses. One of the most terrible
examples is that of the Chixoy hydroelectric dam, which was built during
the military dictatorship in Guatemala. The project resulted in the
massacre of more than 400 Maya Achi people, mostly from the community of
Rio Negro, one of the villages to be flooded by the dam.
The violence against the indigenous people began in 1980, when military
police came to Rio Negro and shot seven people. In July that year, two
representatives from the village agreed to go to a meeting requested by
the National Institute for Electrification (INDE). They took with them the
village's only documentation of resettlement and cash payment agreements.
The mutilated bodies of the two men were found a week later. The
resettlement documents were never recovered.
In February 1982, 73 men and women were ordered by the local military
commander to report to Xoxoc, a village upstream from the reservoir which
had a history of land conflicts and hostility with Rio Negro. Only one
woman returned to Rio Negro. The rest were raped, tortured, then murdered
by the Xoxoc Civil Defense Patrol, one of the notoRious paramilitary units
used by the state as death squads.
But the worse was yet to come. On 13th March, the military rounded up all
the women and children and marched them to a hill above the village and
proceeded to torture and murder 70 women and 107 children. Witness for
Peace produced in 1995 a report based on interviews with survivors, where
the terrible way in which these people were murdered is described in
detail. Two months later a further 82 people were murdered.
Responsibily over this tragedy is shared by all those institutions and
companies which, being aware of the brutality of the Guatemalan regime,
collaborated in building this 300 megawatts dam. The Interamerican
Development Bank and the World Bank provided more than 300 million dollars
in loans. The Italian government provided bilateral aid and export-credit
guarantees. The consortium that planned, designed and supervised
construction for the dam included Lahmeyer International (Germany), Motor
Columbus (Switzerland) and International Engineering Company (USA).
Gogefar (Italy) and Swissboring (Switzerland) were the companies that
actually built the dam. Hochtief (Germany) was the contractor for the
repair work on the tunnels.
In spite of having been instrumental in building a dam which resulted in
this tragedy, none of the above are willing to admit their responsibility.
After an internal investigation, the World Bank acknowledged that a
massacre had occurred, but admitted no responsibility. The companies
involved in Chixoy have always denied knowledge of the massacres, but
local eye-witnesses say that a Cogefar lorry was used by the army during
the massacres and that kidnapped women were taken to the dam building
site, from where they were carried away by helicopter. So many must have
known. But even if they didn't notice anything: didn't they find strange
that 400 people suddenly disappeared from the dam site?
The survivors of Rio Negro have sought redress in national and
international arenas. Material and spiritual reparations are still awaited
by those who survived, but no compensation is possible for the cultural
losses, violence, intimidation, loss of livelihood and psychological
damage suffered by the affected communities.
Article based on information from: "Dams Incorporated. The Record of
Twelve European Dam Building Companies", by Chris Lang, Nick Hildyard,
Kate Geary and Matthew Grainger. Published by Swedish Society for Nature
Conservation, February 2000; "A People Dammed." The Impact of the World
Bank Chixoy Hydroelectric Project in Guatemala", Witness for Peace, 1995
************************************************************
SOUTH AMERICA
- Brazil: Interamerican Development Bank promotes destruction of Upper
Tocantins River
The Tocantins River is the main river in the hydrological system of the
"cerrado" (savanna) and eastern Amazon region of Brazil. The Brazilian
government is planning the construction of eight hydroelectric dams on the
Tocantins and Araguaia Rivers. One of them is Cana Brava Dam, located 250
km north of Brasilia, in the state of Goias, which together with the
already operational Tucurui Dam and the Serra da Mesa Dam will form a
nearly continuous 2,000 km staircase of reservoirs.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is the agency involved in the
provision of financial support to the project by granting a U$S 150
million loan so that Tractabel Brasil Ltda. --a subsidiary of Tractabel
Belgium-- can build the dam. The Bank has already approved a loan for the
construction of the North-South electricity transmission line, which runs
along the Tocantins River, that will link the proposed dams network. If
completed, this complex will severely affect the Tocantins and Araguaia
Rivers, their associated ecosystems and the riverine populations. This
biodiversity and resource-rich region --comprising part of the "cerrado"
and the transition forests of the Amazon-- is already menaced by the high
scale impacts to be provoked by the construction of the Araguaia-Tocantins
hidrovia, an industrial waterway planned for soy bean transport.
The Environmental and Social Impact Brief for the Cana Brava project
performed by the IDB to justify its loan has serious omissions and
misstatements of fact. Its main assumption --that hydroelectric power is
the most desired electricity generation alternative for the region-- is
baseless, since the energy to be generated will be transmitted to the
national electricity grid, principally to industrial cities in
South-Central Brazil. Additionally the real financial, environmental and
social costs of the project were not evaluated.
The IDB's study ignores the fact that the "cerrado" is one of the richest
sites in biodiversity in the world, by considering that endangered species
were not identified during the surveys, and that the Upper Tocantins is a
system less productive when compared with the middle and lower reaches. It
is not even clear whether the survey refers only to the area where the
reservoir would be formed, or also to the broader area which will suffer
the impacts of the dam. Its considerations regarding the social impacts of
the project are also to be questioned. Whereas the report considers that
"there are no major indigenous populations present in the area of direct
influence", it has been demonstrated by the FUNAI (National Indigenous
Foundation of Brazil) and CIMI (Missionary Indigenist Council) that the
area is inhabited by the Ava-Canoeiro indigenous people, a highly
threatened ethnic group, known as the lords of the High Tocantins River
and its entire valley. It is to be underscored that the Ava-Canoeiro have
already suffered the loss of 10% of the area of their reserve because of
the Serra da Mesa Dam. Additionally, an important community of "quilombos"
--descendents of escaped black slaves who manage their land
cooperatively-- live in the area affected by the project. The IDB's report
does not mention them. The impact of the project on the local rural
population is minimized, since the number of families affected by the dam
is far greater than the 110 indicated in the report.
The arrogant attitude of both Tractebel and the IDB have generated a
conflictive atmosphere in the region. Local dwellers have undertaken
direct actions to press the company to discuss relevant issues before the
construction of the dam proceeds. For example, on January 16th 2000, 500
dam-affected people occupied the Cana Brava worksite, and on March 14th,
marches and protests took place in Minacu city. In March 2000 the
coalition International Rivers Network (IRN) addressed the IDB President
Mr. Enrique Iglesias to express its concern regarding the way in which the
Bank was assessing the proposed loan, and to suggest some recommendations
in order to avoid the negative impacts of the megaproject.
Nevertheless, the IDB has turned a deaf ear to protests and
recommendations: in August 2000 a U$S 160,2 million was approved for the
construction of the Cana Brava Dam.
Article based on information from: "BID aprueba U$S 160,2 millones para
apoyar proyecto hidroelectrico Cana Brava en Brasil", 9/8/2000,
http://www.iadb.org ; "O resurgimento dos Ava-Canoeiro", Folha do Meio
Ambiente - Ano 11 - Edic_o 103 - Brasilia/DF, abril-2000,
http://www.folhadomeioambiente.com.br/fma-103/indio103.htm ;
http://irn.org/programs/latamerica/000314.tocantins.html
************************************************************
- Chile: The struggle of the Pehuenche against the Ralco Dam
The Biobio River springs from Icalma and Galletue lakes in the Andes, in
southern Chile and flows during 380 km through forests, agricultural lands
and cities to the Pacific Ocean, draining a watershed of 24,260 km2. Over
one million people use the resources of the Biobio for drinking and
irrigation water, recreation, and fisheries.
In the decade of 1990, Spanish corporation ENDESA (Empresa Nacional de
Electricidad S.A) began to implement its plan to install six hydroelectric
dams on the Biobio, with a total capacity of 2,300 megawatts. Plans to dam
the Biobio originated in the1950s, when electricity generation in Chile
was still state-owned. The first dam, called Pangue, was completed in
1996, and now the company is working in the construction of Ralco, the
largest of the planned dams in the Biobio.
During the construction of Pangue, started in 1990, severe impacts took
place to the detriment of forests and the Pehuenche indigenous people,
traditional inhabitants of the region who resist any attempt of displacing
them from their territories. The role of the International Finance
Corporation (IFC) --private sector arm of the World Bank-- was severely
questioned because of its lack of transparency and its financial support
to such an unsustainable project. During a visit to Santiago in April
1998, Mr. James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, admitted that the
Bank's support to the Pangue hydroelectric project had been a mistake, and
that the Bank had performed "bad work" during the evaluation of the
environmental impact of the project, since the Pehuenche indigenous
peoples that inhabit the area had not been consulted. Nevertheless this
sad story is being repeated in the case of Ralco.
The construction of the 570 megawattt Ralco Dam started shortly after
Pangue was completed, because both dams are supposed to work together for
the generation of electric energy. As a matter of fact, the Ralco Dam has
been designed to regulate the water flow to the Pangue and the other dams
proposed downstream. This 155 meter-high dam with a 3,400 hectare
reservoir, would displace more than 600 people, including 400 indigenous
Pehuenches. The dam would flood over 70 km of the river valley, inundating
the richly diverse forest and destroying its biodiversity.
The Pehuenche, supported by the Biobio Action Group, went to court and at
the same time implemented direct actions on the ground to avoid that the
works for Ralco continue. They completely refuse to abandon their
ancestral lands and to accept the resettlement plans of ENDESA to locate
them in a place high in the Andes, where harsh conditions during winter
reign. Reality is giving the reason to the opponents of the resettlement:
a few families who have already been relocated to the El Huachi and El
Barco areas have publicly denounced ENDESA's failure to honour its
commitments to them in exchange for their land. They are suffering their
livestock's miserable condition during the heavy winter snows, lack of
technical assistance, shortage of firewood and lack of medical assistance.
Pehuenche women are playing a leading role in this struggle, facing the
arrogance of ENDESA and the indifference of the Chilean authorities.
In spite of the growing awareness at home and abroad about the severe
impacts that dams are generating in the Biobio area, the Export
Development Corporation of Canada's government is granting financing
equivalent to US$ 17 million dollars for the ENDESA company to purchase
generating equipment for the planned Ralco Power Station, from the ABB
Power Canada company of Tracy, Quebec.
The future of the Pehuenche and the Ralco Dam is now in the hands of
Justice. In essence, this is a court battle between the Indigenous Law of
1993, designed to protect the lands of the indigenous population, and the
Electricity Law passed during Pinochet's regime, that promotes any energy
generation project. Nevertheless, much depends on the mobilisation of the
Pehunche people for environmental justice and the support it can achieve
at the national and international levels. Within this context, the
Heinrich Boll Foundation's decision to award the Petra Kelly Prize 2000 to
two Mapuche women --Berta and Nicolasa Quintreman Calpan-- as a
recognition of their struggle to protect the Mapuche Pehuenche's rights
shows the increasing international support to this struggle.
Article based on information from: http://irn.org/programs/biobio/ ; Lang,
Chris et al., "Dams incorporated. The record of Twelve European Dam
building Companies", A Report by the Corner House published by the
Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, February 2000; WRM Bulletins 11
and 41.
************************************************************
- Colombia: The Urra Dam and the death of the Sinu River
The Urra Dam megaproject on the Sinu River in the Department of Cordoba,
in the Colombian Atlantic region, constitutes a worldwide known
environmental catastrophe as well as a complete disaster to the local
people. The dam built by the company Urra and openly supported by the
Colombian government --which considers the project vital for the country's
economy-- will flood more than 7,000 hectares of forests and directly
affect the livelihoods and the very existence of the Embera Katio
indigenous people and the fisherfolk communities of the area.
Urra's story is a very long and painful one. The project has provoked
concern and resistance since its start in 1977. The Embera Katio
indigenous people, ancestral dwellers of the affected area, who live on
fishing and hunting, and the fishing communities of the Upper Sinu, with
the support of national and international organizations, have repeatedly
claimed against this megaproject and resorted to every peaceful available
way, including trials at the Court, interviews with the authorities and
occupations of Ministry buildings and resistance to abandon their lands.
Nevertheless, both Urra and the Ministry of the Environment have ignored
them, as well as several decisions of the Constitutional High Court of
Colombia. The works continued and in November 1999 the filling up of the
Urra 1 dam on the Sinu River began.
In the meantime, Urra also tried to generate conflicts among the Embera
Katio and to weaken their resistance by reaching partial agreements with
some of their groups to the detriment of the others. During this unequal
struggle, the Embera Katio and the fisherfolk, as well as many of those
who support them, have also suffered severe human rights violations, some
of them being even murdered, threatened or forced into exile. The
Department of Cordoba, where the dam is located, is controlled by
paramilitary groups.
An international mission of independent observers that visited the
conflict area in March 2000 confirmed the environmental and social impacts
of the project. Downstream from the dam, the river level has already
decreased dramatically, resulting in the collapse of the river's banks and
the entailing destruction of the peoples' houses. The population of the
fish "bocachico" --which is the main source of protein for the Embera
Katio and a basic product in the economy of the local fisherfolk, has
drastically decreased because of the sudden dry up of the wetlands of
Cienaga Grande de Lorica and other wetlands of the Lower Sinu, provoked by
the reduction of the natural floods of the river after the construction of
the dam. The reservoir was filled up without removing the existent
biomass, which will result in the eutrophication of waters and increase
the emissions of methane and carbon dioxide to the atmosphere, the two
main greenhouse gases. Logging and burning of wood is being practised in
several places nearby the dam, which will further enhance the
sedimentation process in the reservoir.
The loss of their lands by the Embera Katio is complete. Additionally,
those living upstream are powerless to prevent the flooding of their
fields, houses, sacred sites and cemeteries. Effects are also apparent
downstream. Because of the disruption of the hydrological system, the
natural flow has diminished and water quality has deteriorated disturbing
the food network. Further impacts are anticipated on plankton, riparian
vegetation, invertebrates, birds and other animals. The Sinu River is
dying.
What will happen with the indigenous people and fisherfolk displaced from
their world in contact with nature? Without land and resources, and
deprived of their own culture, they will be forced to settle in any of the
shanty towns existing in the main Colombian cities. "Dueda tu beu ea
embera neta Embera ea" ("The life and the dignity of the Embera Katio will
not be drowned") is the motto of a struggle that goes on to avoid such an
appalling future.
Article based on information from:
http://irn.org/programs/latamerica/000105.urra.html;
"Informe Final de la Mision Internacional de Observacion para Evaluar la
Situacion de los Pueblos U'wa, afectados por Occidental, y Embera-Katio y
Comunidades de Pescadores y Campesinos del Bajo Sinu, afectados por la
represa Urra. Colombia, Marzo 15-21, 2000" por la
Mision Internacional de Observacion. Berkeley/Quito, 25 de mayo de 2000;
WRM Bulletins 29 and 30.
************************************************************
* GENERAL
************************************************************
- The World Commission on Dams' report
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) released its report on November 2000,
after having carried out detailed studies and surveys on a number of large
dams throughout the world. What follows are quotes from the sections
"People and Large Dams" and "Ecosystems and Large Dams." The full report
--in several languages-- is available at: http://www.dams.org/report/
"In terms of the social impacts of dams, the Commission found that the
negative effects were frequently neither adequately assessed nor accounted
for. The range of these impacts is substantial, including on the lives,
livelihoods and health of the affected communities dependent on the
riverine environment:
- Some 40-80 million people have been physically displaced by dams
worldwide
- Millions of people living downstream from dams - particularly those
reliant on natural floodplain function and fisheries - have also suffered
seRious harm to their livelihoods and the future productivity of their
resources has been put at risk
- Many of the displaced were not recognised (or enumerated) as such, and
therefore were not resettled or compensated
- Where compensation was provided it was often inadequate, and where the
physically displaced were enumerated, many were not included in
resettlement programmes
- Those who were resettled rarely had their livelihoods restored, as
resettlement programmes have focused on physical relocation rather than
the economic and social development of the displaced
- The larger the magnitude of displacement, the less likely it is that
even the livelihoods of affected communities can be restored
- Even in the 1990s, impacts on downstream livelihoods were, in many
cases, not adequately assessed or addressed in the planning and design of
large dams
In sum, the Knowledge Base demonstrated a generalised lack of commitment
or lack of capacity to cope with displacement. In addition, large dams in
the Knowledge Base have also had significant adverse effects on cultural
heritage through the loss of cultural resources of local communities and
the submergence and degradation of plant and animal remains, burial sites
and archaeological monuments.
The Knowledge Base indicated that the poor, other vulnerable groups and
future generations are likely to bear a disproportionate share of the
social and environmental costs of large dam projects without gaining a
commensurate share of the economic benefits:
- Indigenous and tribal peoples and vulnerable ethnic minorities have
suffered disproportionate levels of displacement and negative impacts on
livelihood, culture and spiritual existence
- Affected populations living near reservoirs as well as displaced people
and downstream communities have often faced adverse health and livelihood
outcomes from environmental change and social disruption
- Among affected communities, gender gaps have widened and women have
frequently borne a disproportionate share of the social costs and were
often discriminated against in the sharing of benefits
Where such inequities exist in the distribution of the costs and benefits,
the Global Review emphasises that the 'balance-sheet' approach to adding
up the costs and benefits is increasingly seen as unacceptable on equity
grounds and as a poor means of choosing the 'best' projects. In any event,
the true economic profitability of large dam projects remains elusive, as
the environmental and social costs of large dams were poorly accounted for
in economic terms.
More to the point, failures to account adequately for these impacts and to
fulfil commitments that were made have led to the impoverishment and
suffering of millions, giving rise to growing opposition to dams by
affected communities worldwide. Innovative examples of processes for
making reparations and sharing project benefits are emerging that provide
hope that past injustices can be remedied and future ones avoided."
Regarding the environmental impacts of large dams, the report states:
"The generic nature of the impacts of large dams on ecosystems,
biodiversity and downstream livelihoods is increasingly well known. From
the WCD Knowledge Base it is clear that large dams have led to:
- the loss of forests and wildlife habitat, the loss of species
populations and the degradation of upstream catchment areas due to
inundation of the reservoir area
- the loss of aquatic biodiversity, of upstream and downstream fisheries,
and of the services of downstream floodplains, wetlands, and riverine,
estuarine and adjacent marine ecosystems; and
- cumulative impacts on water quality, natural flooding and species
composition where a number of dams are sited on the same river
On balance, the ecosystem impacts are more negative than positive and they
have led, in many cases, to significant and irreversible loss of species
and ecosystems. In some cases, however, enhancement of ecosystem values
does occur, through the creation of new wetland habitat and the fishing
and recreational opportunities provided by new reservoirs.
The Commission found that reservoirs sampled so far by scientists all emit
greenhouse gases, as do natural lakes, due to the rotting of vegetation
and carbon inflows from the catchment. The scale of such emissions is
highly variable. Preliminary data from a Case Study hydropower dam in
Brazil show that the gross level of these emissions is significant,
relative to emissions from equivalent thermal power plants.
However, in other reservoirs studied (notably those in boreal zones),
gross emissions of greenhouse gases are significantly lower than the
thermal alternative. A full comparison would require measurements of the
emissions from natural pre-impoundment habitats. More research is needed
on a case-by-case basis to demonstrate the capacity of hydropower to
offset climate change.
Efforts to date to counter the ecosystem impacts of large dams have met
with limited success due to the lack of attention to anticipating and
avoiding such impacts, the poor quality and uncertainty of predictions,
the difficulty of coping with all impacts, and the only partial
implementation and success of mitigation measures. More specifically:
- It is not possible to mitigate many of the impacts of reservoir creation
on terrestrial ecosystems and biodiversity, and efforts to 'rescue'
wildlife have met with little long-term success
- The use of fish passes to mitigate the blockage of migratory fish has
had little success, as the technology has often not been tailored to
specific sites and species
- Good mitigation results from a good information base; early co-operation
between ecologists, the dam design team and affected people; and regular
monitoring and feedback on the effectiveness of mitigation measures
- Environmental flow requirements (which include managed flood releases)
are increasingly used to reduce the impacts of changed streamflow regimes
on aquatic, floodplain and coastal ecosystems downstream
Given the limited success of traditional mitigation measures, increased
attention through legislation is now given to avoidance or minimisation of
ecological impacts through setting aside particular river segments or
basins in their natural state and through the selection of alternative
projects, sites or designs. In addition, governments are experimenting
with a 'compensatory' approach, offsetting the loss of ecosystems and
biodiversity caused by a large dam through investment in conservation and
regeneration measures and through protection of other threatened sites of
equivalent ecological value.
Finally, in a number of industrialised countries, but particularly in the
United States, ecosystem restoration is being implemented as a result of
the decommissioning of large and small dams."
In general terms, the above findings reaffirm what local peoples and
environmentalists have been suffering and denouncing for years. But the
report's importance is that it now gives an official stamp of approval to
those claims. We hope that this will signal the beginning of the end of
large destructive dams which have resulted --as the report rightly
states-- in "the impoverishment and suffering of millions."
************************************************************
- Hydroelectric dams are no solution to climate change
The international and national dam lobbyists have been fast to adapt their
discourse to the changing world situation. Given the widespread concern
over climate change related to greenhouse gas emissions, dam promoters are
now stressing that hydroelectricity is a clean source of energy, thus
being the best candidate to substitute fossil fuel-based energy sources.
But: is it really clean?
The existing research shows that hydropower is not only socially and
environmentally destructive, but that it can also make a significant
contribution to global warming, particularly in the tropics.
Through the processes of growth and decay, soils, forests and wetlands
continuously consume and emit large amounts of carbon dioxide and methane,
the two most important greenhouse gases. When those ecosystems are flooded
by the dams' reservoirs, the pattern of fluxes of CO2 and methane with the
atmosphere is totally altered. Plants and soils decompose when flooded and
will eventually release almost all their stored carbon. Permanently
flooding tropical wetlands will tend to increase their methane emissions
as well as making them a net source of CO2.
Researcher Philip Fearnside carried out studies in 1995 on two dams in
Brazil: Balbina and Tucurui. He calculated their impact on global warming
by assessing the amount of forest they flooded and the rate at which
vegetation would decay at different depths of their reservoirs. His
findings were that in 1990 (6 years after Tucurui started to fill and 3
years after the gates were closed at Balbina), the Tucurui reservoir had
emitted 9,450,000 tonnes of CO2 and 90,000 tons of methane, while Balbina
had emitted 23,750,000 tonnes of CO2 and 140,000 tons of methane. His
conclusion was that Tucurui had 60 per cent as much impact on global
warming as a coal-fired plant generating the same amount of electricity,
while Balbina had 26 times more impact on global warming than the
emissions from an equivalent coal-fired power station.
The above should suffice to show that hydropower is not clean regarding
climate change. But there's even more. A comprehensive accounting of a
dam's contribution to global warming should also include the emissions
from the fossil fuels used during dam construction, those from the
production of the cement, steel and other materials used in the dam, as
well as the changes in greenhouse gas fluxes due to the land use and other
changes which the dam encourages, such as deforestation, the conversion of
floodplain wetlands to intensive agriculture, the adoption of irrigation
on once rainfed lands, and the increased use of fossil-fuel-based
artificial fertilizers.
In sum, large hydroelectric dams are not only no solution to climate
change but, on the contrary, are part of the problem.
Article based on information from: Patrick McCully, "Silenced Rivers. The
Ecology and Politics of large Dams", Zed Books 1996
************************************************************
- International Day of Action against dams
Many people around the world are preparing an International Day of Action
Against Dams and for Rivers, Water and Life, which will take place on
March 14th, 2001. Last year, nearly 70 actions took place in 26 countries
to celebrate the Day of Action. From Australia to Uganda, tens of
thousands of people participated in demonstrations, rallies, educational
events and ceremonies. Even more people are expected to participate this
year.
The Day of Action was inspired by participants at the First International
Meeting of People Affected by Dams held in Curitiba, Brazil in 1997. They
declared, "We are strong, diverse, and united and our cause is just. To
symbolize our growing unity, we declare that March 14th --the Brazilian
Day of Struggles Against Dams-- will from now on become the International
Day of Action Against Dams and for Rivers, Water and Life."
Over the last year, the anti-dam movement has gained huge momentum --from
the release of the highly critical World Commission on Dams report to
unprecedented networking in Latin America, Asia and Africa to promising
dam removal efforts in Asia, Europe and North America. The idea is to keep
the momentum growing.
People and organizations throughout the world are asked to plan an event
on March 14 as part of the Day of Action. International Rivers Network
serves as the International Coordinator for the Day of Action and its
website contains information on previous Days of Action as well as on this
year's ( http://www.irn.org/dayofaction ). For more information, please
contact dayofaction@irn.org
--
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Lori Pottinger, Director, Southern Africa Program,
and Editor, World Rivers Review
International Rivers Network
1847 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, California 94703, USA
Tel. (510) 848 1155 Fax (510) 848 1008
http://www.irn.org
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